


ADRIACVS

FROM TRIESTE TO VALONA
THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM
AND ITALY'S ASPIRATIONS




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PRELIMINARY NOTES.

When Italy, in May 1915, entered the war by the side of the Entente Powers, in a moment unfavourable to their arms, she proclaimed as her war aims—besides those common to all, of justice and freedom from German militarism and economical invasion—the liberation from Austrian yoke of Italian unredeemed territory, and a more favourable solution of the strategical problem in the Adriatic Sea.

While her aspirations on the whole were considered just and equitable, their practical territorial realization gave rise to several divergences of opinion, rising chiefly, either from jealousy on the part of those who dread a too ample development of the strength and might of the young Italian nation, or from excessive sympathy with the new peoples who had come in existence after the wreck of the Austrian Empire. The subtle policy of the Hapsburg government in creating artificially eth-

nical displacements, with the purpose of preventing what must now inevitably become reality if justice is to be done, largely contributed in producing even in competent and influential circles, the opinion that Italy's claims are the outcome of unjustifiable imperialism, adverse not only to the sacred rights of other peoples, but also to the sound principles of distributive justice as well.

This articles purposes to demonstrate on positive and if possible on irrefutable grounds the good right of Italy, as well the speciousness of the arguments put into force to oppose her claim, and the necessity for her to obtain, after so bloody and terrible a war, such a position in the Adriatic as to offer her a promise of lasting peace and healthy natural development in the future.

It will also be shown that Italian claims, far from being in contrast with the true rights and interests of the States overlooking the eastern shores of the Adriatic, will bestow on them all the benefits accruing from friendly intercourse with a democratic Nation, industrially and economically solid, and sufficiently mature to pass on to others, its own culture and activity.

HISTORICAL NOTES.

It is not purposed to repeat here the history of the Italian unredeemed regions: it is well known, and it has recently been amply and exhaustively related; we shall limit ourselves to pointing out some historical recurrences which go far to prove that in all times the strategical and economical problem of the Adriatic sea took the same form as to-day, forcibly obliging the ruler of the western shore to ensure the complete control of the whole of that inlying sea by the conquest of its eastern shore. Thus Rome, having become the capital and the intellectual economic centre of the Italian peninsula, and then, following the first Punic war, a sea power, began at once to experience, at the hands of the Illyrian pirates, the inconvenience of the peculiar inferiority under which she laboured.


We find her therefore, as early as 226 B. C. using her newly-fledged navy in a first conflict with the Illyrians, followed by no less than nine subsequent wars. To prevent a revival of that scourge her rulers conquered once for all the whole eastern shore of the Adriatic, which conquest they completed in 78 B. C. by the utter subjection of its hinterland, constituting it into a new province (10 A. D.) under the name of Dalmatia.

The Republic of Venice was confronted with the same dilemma as soon as she had ensured her independence and begun to enlarge her maritime power. She was soon led to understand that before undertaking ulterior development, her own safety demanded a favourable solution of the Adriatic problem. Hence the fruitless attempts of the two doges Candiano I and Candiano II (932-948) and later, at the request of the Dalmatians themselves, the occupation of numerous islands and the principal seaports by doge Orseolo II (998-1000), who proclaimed himself "Dux Dalmatiæ"

Throughout her whole existence the glorious Republic of Venice set the highest value on the possession of the Dalmatian coast, which is proved by her secular struggles against Hungary (1105-1409) and against the Turks (1618-1718).

Napoleon too, by the treaty of Presburg (1806) recognized the necessity of uniting Dalmatia and Istria to the Kingdom of Italy.

On the whole Dalmatia can boast nearly two thousand years of uninterrupted Latin or rather Italian traditions, never refuted by anyone, not even by Austria, up to 1866, for only since then did that Power begin, for obvious reasons, her efforts to alter, and to make appear as altered, the ethnical features of that region as in the case of Venezia-Giulia and Istria.



Pola - Commemoration of Nazario Sauro, the Italian hero hanged by the Austrians.
The crowd in silence and attentive during Sen Benelli's speech.



Capodistria - Municipal building.
(Phot. Alinari).

GEOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE ADRIATIC RIVER SYSTEM.

Competent authorities are of opinion that, in pre-historic times the basin of the Adriatic was but the continuation of the plain of the Po, whether this latter were completely submerged up to the foot of the Piedmontese Alps as in the Upper Tertiary Formation, or whether it reached with its alluvions at least as far as the Gulf of Quarnero, as appears to have been the case during the Quaternary. Anyhow the geographical and geological survey of the lands on either shore, a glance at the physical map of Europe will convince anyone having some positive notion of general geography, of the singular and sharp division of this basin from the surrounding territories.

Its confines on one side are evidently formed by the Appennine watershed, then by that of the Alps in their whole extent, comprising the Julian range, and therefore on the East, the crest of the Velebiti Mountains and of the Dinaric Alps as far as the Narenta; South of this river, by the Adriatic watershed line.

The climatic and geological features, the flora and fauna of the eastern Adriatic coast zone are identical to those on the eastern slopes of the Appennines; in

fact, geologically speaking, Mount Conero near Ancona, the Gargan group and part of the Apulian tableland may safely be considered as of Dalmatian origin; whereas, to the contrary, all the above said features are essentially different from those of the region lying East of the Dinaric Range and which properly belong to the Porto system.

That the entire Trentino region, with the upper valley of the Adige up to its natural watershed; and also the region comprised between the present political confine and the watershed of the Julian Alps belong geographically to Italy, are facts which no geographer, even those of Austro-Hungarian nationality, has ever attempted to question.

Opinions differed however, according to their guiding interests, as to whether the geographical confine of the southern part of the Julian Alps included or excluded the port of Fiume. Also whether the coast-zone of the Adriatic up to the Dinaric watershed belonged or not to Italy.

When you consider the plastic relief of the entire mass of the eastern Alps, as a whole, it appears to divide and break up into a number of lengthy spurs which subside and loose themselves on the plains of Hungary and Slavonia: except one which carries on the main line of the watershed, continues with a few

local depressions, but without a break, as far as the group of the Nevoso, which closes the Carso system in Istria. Reaching the Gulf of Quarnero and stretching beyond, it gains the Morlacca region, running ever southwards. This maximum summit-line, this superficial divisory ridge between the Adriatic and Black Sea watersheds, suddenly lowers near Fiume, and this depression is generally accepted as the southern limit of the Julian, and the beginning of the long-ranged Dinaric Alpes.

But it must be borne in mind that the above delineation is wholly conventional: it is only a change of names from Julian Alps in the North to Dinaric in the South—leaving the line of summit-heights unaltered—the watershed-line continuing unchanged: this line according to Philipson forms a clearly-defined uninterrupted barrier between the Italian region and the rest of Europe.

Thus Giotto Dainelli in his lecture on Dalmatia published in the "Geographical Pages of our War" edited by the Royal Italian Geographical Society, and his clear definition appears to us an exhaustive demonstration of Italy's geographical ownership, both of the contested Istrian tract between the mouth of the Arbe and the Rock of San Marco, and of the entire remaining Dalmatian coast down to the Narento river.

Moreover the base-rock of the Dalmatian coast, both on the mainland and the islands, shows the same geographical features as Istria and the Carso, so that it is but the direct continuation of these two regions: these features, as has already been said, are to be retraced identically in Mount Conero, in the Gargano, the Murge of Bari and in Apulia beyond Otranto. The region due East of the Dinaric range is characterized by a totally different conformation which links it up with the rest of the Balkan peninsula.

The climate of Dalmatia is similar to that of the opposite shore: balnearic, sharpened by the peculiar E. S.-E. wind (*bora*) in the northern parts, mild and mediterranean towards the South. Only inland where the strip grows wider, the climate becomes decidedly continental, with severe cold in winter and hot in summer.

As the climate, so the Dalmatian flora differs essentially from the Balkanic one, which presents characteristics common to the whole remaining Pontus Basin, whereas it is identical to that of our own peninsula, and lastly its fauna presents close and typical analogies to that of Italy.

Even if all this did not sufficiently prove how very Italian Dalmatia is geographically speaking, we might add that the impassible range of the Velebiti and Di-

naric mountains, severs that region from Balkania much more completely than does the Adriatic from the Italian peninsula, as is proved by the fact that up to the present writing, barring one narrow-gauge railway that, following the course of the Narenta connects Metkovich with Serajevo, and another leading from Tenin towards the Bosnian plateaux, no modern means of communication have been able to cross that arduous barrier.

ETHNICAL CONDITIONS OF THE IRREDENT TERRITORIES

The ethnical aspect of lands in which individuals of various races co-mingle must not be considered from the merely statistic point of view, least of all that of official statistics, often biassed and misleading.

Other elements must here be taken into account, such as the cultural, moral, economical, political, historical and migratory factors, which are apt to modify profoundly the ethnical quality of a region with regard to the naked findings of a statistical report.

This remark is all the truer, when our field of observation becomes narrower reducing itself from a region to a district, from a district to a centre of population and, when the purely objective study of the distribution of nationalities and tongues, rather than an aim to itself, is to form the substratum on which to found the rights of a State over regions lying beyond its political confines. If we did not do so we should arrive at obviously absurd conclusions, at inadmissible claims, even for those having immediate advantages in view as in the case of Italy whose emigrants have populated whole regions.

Among the phenomena to be held in account, emi-

gration is perhaps the most important and most complex.

Can emigration confer on the mother-country the right of sovereignty over a given region in which it attains an absolute majority over the pre-existing population?

It evidently can in the case of thinly-populated lands inhabited by barbaric peoples, or having a decidedly inferior standard of civilization, when emigration takes the character of regular colonization, but not when emigrants, originating from a less civilized race, come to settle in a territory where the pre-existing inhabitants, even though outnumbered, are more highly civilized.

Certainly not when that minority preserves all its national character, and even shows itself capable of assimilating the majority, maintains and diffuses its own culture and its own language, dominating the trade, industry and wealth of the country, filling the most important civil posts, and exercising the liberal professions almost exclusively.

Still less can such a form of emigration constitute a right when it is not the outcome of natural and necessary expansion—as is Italian emigration at present, and as the English was in former times—but is instead the proceed of political conditions and governmental tendencies contrary alike to the laws of Nature and sound Ethics.

In a special study of the unredeemed Italian lands, we need to make a special distinction between the case of the Trentino territory and upper Adige valley (Venezia Tridentina) and that of the Venezia Giulia, Istria and Dalmatia.

In the first of these regions the native Italian element has been brought into contact with German culture and invading methods. Notwithstanding this, German infiltration has made singularly little headway in Trentino proper, so that the great majority of the people have remained Italian. Instead in the northern part of the upper Adige valley the bulk of the people are German, while towards the southern end, bordering on Trentino, they are of mixed extraction.

But apart from the fact that, as in all unredeemed Italian districts the southwards tendency of the Teutonic races has been encouraged by the anti-Italian tactics of the Austria-Hungarian government and fostered by the long-sighted German policy, ethnical considerations, in spite of their undoubted value, must, for the sake of Italy's claim to these regions, yield to geographical and strategical motives.

The Venezia Tridentina, as we have seen, belongs beyond all dispute to Italy, and Napoleon himself recognized this fact in his *Memoirs*, where he briefly and precisely defined the confines of Italy in these words:

Trieste - Richard's Arc.
(Phot. Alinari).





Visit of the King of Italy in Trieste.
The crowd waiting for the passage of the royal motor-car.

" L'Italie est environnée par les Alpes et par la mer; ses limites naturelles sont déterminées avec autant de précision que si c'était une île ".

But above all other reasons, Italy's right for claiming her natural boundaries is backed by strategical reasons.

The frontier here, as elsewhere, was marked out in 1866 with a view of affording the Austrians readier possibilities for invading Lombardy and Venetia by various routes: by the Tonale, the Giudicarie, Val Lagarina, Valsugana, etc., etc., actually threatening the rear of Italian defences on the eastern frontier.

However, even accepting without criticism the present ethnical phenomenon, one cannot forget that that district is inhabited by about 400,000 Italians, who have, with marvellous national spirit, constantly withstood every attempt at Germanization on the part of the Vienna government, and of the various associations for promoting culture, sport or Teutonic propaganda.

Nor can it be said that, owing to these racial considerations, Italy ought to limit her claims to Trentino proper, for in that case her frontier would be almost as calamitous as it was when the war began.

In Venezia Giulia, Istria and Dalmatia, the ethnical state of things differs widely. Here the Italian element, which may well be considered indigenuous, has been brought in contact with an unquestionably inferior de-

gree of civilization and, in spite of Slav immigration, helped on and encouraged by the Austrian government, the chief populated centres have maintained a strong Italian majority (1).

As for Dalmatia, it is worth while to dwell a moment on the statistical reports, also to demonstrate, by this special example, the unreliability of Austrian statistics in general, purposely biassed and falsified to our detriment.

According to Austrian statistics, the number of Italians in Dalmatia would be only 18,000! Giotto Dainelli (2), Professor of Geographical Science at the University of Pisa, has been able to prove by reports and data deducted from the *same Austrian census papers*, that the Italians in Dalmatia number well above 80,000!

But the fact that these lands are Italian, is indelibly proclaimed also by Nature, history, monuments, and by

(1) By the Austrian census of 1910, the unreliability of which is well known, Trieste numbered 118,959 Italians, 29,439 Italian subjects, 56,916 Slovans, 11,856 Germans, 2403 Serbo-Croats, and Fiume 26,000 Italians, 6000 Italian subjects, 12,000 Slavs and 6400 Magyars.

For the chief Dalmatian centres see: *Dalmatia, Fiume and other unredeemed Adriatic lands*. Historic-statistical study with large map of the eastern Italian frontier. 6th thousand. Milan, Casa editrice "Risorgimento", 1917.

(2) "How many are the Italians in Dalmatia?". Extract from Nos. III-IV 25th year of the *Italian Geographical Review*.

the strenuous and painful efforts of the Italians to preserve to those lands their Latin imprint.

Besides, notwithstanding their numerical superiority, the Slavs cannot boast a right to priority. The first inhabitants of Dalmatia were the Illyrians, now extinct by fusion with the Romans. The modern Albanians are thought to be their sole survivors.

Later on Dalmatia continued Latin: her chief towns from Arbe to Cattaro were built by the Romans, while her monuments, commerce, art, and the various manifestations of her civilization, were Roman or Venetian. The language, too, remained neo-Latin, assuming those special characteristics for which philologists have termed it "Dalmatic", transforming itself later on into the Venetian forms of speech which prevail now days in all Dalmatian towns. (See *Historical Journal of Italian literature*. LXIX, p. 377 and 391).

Cultural reasons confirm its Italian origin: Dalmatian thought was ever Roman and Italian, and the most illustrious Dalmatians always reckoned themselves Italians, from St. Gerome to Marco Polo, from Fortunio to Lubin, from Tommaseo to Colautti. For Tommaseo we need only mention his vast linguistic works (Italian dictionary, Dictionary of synonyms), and in general his exquisitely Italian literary work to prove what power and activity the Italian traditions still retain in Dalmatian lands.

The objection, that according to statistics the Slavs form the majority of the inhabitants to-day, cannot stand if we reflect that the first civilized inhabitants of this region were the Dalmatian, *i. e.*, a people resulting from the fusion of the ancient Illyrians with the Romans, who kept alive the Roman traditions also under the new rulers of the Adriatic, the Venetians. To this day the physical and moral features of the Dalmatians and the Serbo-Croats differ widely on either side of the Dinaric Mountain range.

The Austrian government, however, has in its statistics endeavoured to reduce to a minimum the indigenous Latin and Italian elements, by fakes of all kinds, chief of which that of passing for Serbo-Croats an important group of inhabitants: the Morlacs of Dalmatia, who undoubtedly belong to the Latin race, although for the past two centuries they have adopted a corrupt form of speech, made up of Slav dialects mixed with numerous latinisms.

All ethnographers of authority (Oberbrimmer, Richter, Biedermann, *Germans*; Ascoli Bartoli, etc., *Italians*) agree in the opinion that the Morlacs are not immigrated Slavs, but belong to the ancient Illyrian latinized population that has resisted all foreign influences. Now taking into account that these Morlacs, dispersed over various districts, amount to about 300,000, and that

in the towns and boroughs of Dalmatia the Italian-speaking inhabitants number over 100,000, the falseness of the Austrian statistics reports is obvious.

What has been said of Dalmatia holds good also for Istria and Venetia Giulia, which were Italian even before Dalmatia, but for all these regions the Austrian government has not only tried to fake the statistics, but done worse, by encouraging the Slav immigration everywhere, which influx before 1866, was of a totally different character from the present movement. Before that date it was a spontaneous migration, due not only to the attraction of the sea-coast, and the economical motive of cheaper transport by water and consequent exchange of products with other lands, but also to the natural trend of an inferior civilization towards contact with a superior one. About the year 1650, many Slavs and Croats immigrated to Dalmatia and Istria, flying from the Turkish invasion, thus these new comers mixed and fused of their own free will with the stronger and more cultured Italians, adopting their manners, customs and language. They, being mostly peasants, the direction of civil concerns and all the liberal professions, remained in the hands of the Italians (schools, the law-courts, journalism, etc.). Austria herself used to call them "Italian provinces".

After 1866, as soon as Austria perceived that Italian

irredentism was daily growing more threatening and pugnacious in spirit and attitude, she resolved to make use of this migratory current duly regulated and encouraged for political aims. This was the starting point of a complete and elaborate programme for the Slavization of all Italian territories, granting facilitations of all kinds to the Slavs, both in public and private life, to the detriment of the Italian element, thus conferring to this migratory movement a character of usurpation, aimed to supplant the Italian race.

Hence the mixed Courts of Justice, the tables in two languages, the exclusion of Italian subjects from public employments, which were then handed over to the Slavs immigrated with their families, and the imposition of Slovenic schools; faked elections, non observance of recognized civil rights, etc., etc.

The resistance opposed by the Italians to all this, especially in Trieste, Gorizia, Fiume and Zara, which latter has won for itself the surname of "the Unconquered", is well known and is a source of deep proud joy for us, and for our brothers in their patient and faithful vigil. And yet, in spite of all Austrian political artifice, the chief centres of population, civil life and culture have remained Italian, as Italian are the leading men in art and politics. Italian, up to a short while ago had remained the majority of the Deputies in Par-

liament, in the Provincial Diets, and in the Municipal Councils.

We may therefore conclude that the rights of Italy over the Trento district, the upper valley of the Adige, Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia, are deeply rooted in the principle of nationality, in geography and history, not less than in strategical and military reasons, which latter we propose to deal with separately.

THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC.

The prominent features of the mountain and river-system of both shores of the Adriatic are familiar to everybody. To quote Nazario Sauro's apt and happy definition of the eastern coast with regard to the western, it is "like the high bank of a canal commanding the low one in front of it". So we shall refrain from even a summary description of it, and pass on at once to set forth the position and value of the naval bases contained therein, considering such ports, harbours, gulfs, canals, etc., etc., as might permanently or temporarily be used as naval bases.

On the Western coast, proceeding from S. to N. we first find Otranto; a narrow harbour only fit to shelter a few torpedo-boats, and possessing scarcely any military value. Then comes Brindisi, an excellent natural port capable of being powerfully fortified, although it lacks surrounding heights. But the inner harbours are too small for a modern fleet, while the largest sheet of water, that comprised between the isle of St. Andrea and Le Pedagne, beyond the town defences, offers insufficient protection to ships anchored in it. Very serious indeed would be the position of a squadron lying at

anchor if surprised by the enemy appearing in anything like force before Brindisi, whether it tried a rush for the sea or whether it received the attack remaining at anchor (Table 3rd).

Going on up the coast, we find the ports of Bari and Barletta obviously of no military value, beyond which no inlet occurs until Ancona, unless we count the little moorage of the Tremiti Isles, insecure because of its shallows, and extremely narrow.

True there is the Lake of Varano which might, after vast and expensive works, become a safe port, but it too lacks the chief essentials for a good naval base, that of moorings sufficiently removed from the extreme sea-front.

Ancona, since the advent of the great modern battle-ships, has lost what very little value she possessed even at the time of Lissa.

Still farther north, Porto Corsini and Ravenna could only serve as shelter for small torpedo-boats, and thus we get to Venice, which, though in former times an almost ideal military port, is now reduced to seeing her best features stripped of all value and her worst points aggravated, owing to the gigantic progress of artillery and to the size of modern war-vessels. This is so much the case, that although her three outlets to the sea considerably distant one from the other still remain

precious assets, as do the various moorings scattered over the vast lagoon and, too, the facility of securing the outlets against surprises from the outside still the shallowness and winding course of her channels, against which excavation and dredging are of no avail, make it impossible for modern battle-ships to get inside the lagoon. Also the proximity of the Arsenal to the sea-front, the insufficient height of the dunes bounding the lagoon towards the open, which form its military as well as its sea-defences, and finally the strength of the currents, render Venice totally unfit for the role of chief base of a modern battle-fleet.

On the opposite shore, instead, we find innumerable moorings, more or less roomy, more or less adapted for transformation into thoroughly efficient naval bases.

Passing over Trieste and the other minor recesses on the Istrian coast, we come at once to Pola, (Table 4th) endowed with excellent though not ideal features, and well fitted as a base for a not too numerous battle fleet. Very good defensive qualities, thanks to the Brioni islets guarding the entry, and the vast sheet of water preceding it. Good too the hydrographical condition of the inner anchorage, and lastly, the features of its land-front are the most favorable for a successful defence.

The whole coast from Pola to Cattaro, with its adjacent islands and its splendid natural ports, may be said

to constitute a large, unique, magnificent naval base, such as there are few existing in Nature (Table 2nd). The northern part, especially, with its numberless channels running parallel to the shore, protected as it is by islands of sufficient height to conceal the movements of any fleet, with its numerous outlets to the sea, may afford to a fleet holding it ample choice for its operations, as circumstances might advise. South of this section, Sebenico with the Lake of Procliana, is another natural port, capacious and secure not only from rough weather, but from hostile approaches of whatsoever nature, besides being easily defendable owing to its natural configuration.

From Spalato to Cattaro, both first-rate natural harbours, from a naval and military point of view, the same conditions repeat themselves, although less propitiously, owing to the fact of the islands being fewer, and the direction of the channels no longer parallel, but almost at right angles to it. On the other hand, the group of the Curzolane Islands, stretching farther out across the Adriatic, act as watchful sentinels towards the opposite shore.

Along the strip between Cattaro and Valona, the coast presents far fewer indents, no more islands, no more natural ports to speak of, nor even inlets that would allow the artificial formation of a naval base, however unpretending.

We now arrive at Valona (Table 4th), wrongly proclaimed as the key of the Adriatic, and which in reality is, technically speaking, by no means the first class naval base it was made out to be.

Wide and capacious enough to contain a fleet of any size, it is completely open to the north-easterly winds, which ruffle up the sea in such a way as to impede seriously, and often to interrupt, all traffic besides making the anchorage insecure even for large ships. The "scirocco" wind, bane of the southern Adriatic, blowing harder for having had to force its way through the gully of Otranto Channel, sweeps down on it from the cliffs in the lofty mountains that surround the bay, coming in sudden squalls, equal in violence if not superior, to those of Gibraltar.

Then, the interior of the vast harbour has no secondary inlets, creeks or coves, that might afford shelter to the smaller craft. The two outlets between Cape Linguetta and Sasemo, as that between this latter island and the mainland, lend themselves badly to a good defence, particularly with regard to submarines, the first because of its shoals, the second for its great width.

Having now cast a glance at the military and naval geography of the Adriatic, we shall endeavour to estimate the strategical value of its coast, both as a whole and in detail, in relation to each of its bases. But to

be able to do so, we must bear in mind the peculiar shape of the Adriatic which is less like a sea than a long channel with parallel shores.

Only in very few places does the distance between these reach 100 knots, so that it can be crossed in a few hours by modern battleships, and in little over 3 by the fastest torpedo-boats. We must also add an important drawback for a fleet operating from the Italian shore. Owing to the constant orientation of the two coasts, an enemy starting at night from the sheltered Dalmatian base with the Italian coast for his objective, could get there by surprise at day-break with the sun behind him, that is in the best possible condition for making good use of his artillery. On the contrary the situation would be reversed if the Italian fleet were to attempt a surprise under cover of night; it would have to enter into action with the sun full in front of it, which would be a considerable disadvantage.

It was for this very reason that, in the recent action upon Durazzo, all idea of a surprise had to be given up, and the Italian force appeared on the scene after 12 o'clock, so as to have the sun in the back. Speaking in general way, anyone can see how admirably the Dalmatian coast lends itself, with its countless shelters and outlets, to submarine warfare, and to how many and great dangers a naval force would be exposed,


which, starting from Venice or Brindisi had, for some strategical reason to cross the Adriatic longitudinally, either in part or from end to end.

But even apart from so great a danger, it will be seen that a fleet, having at its disposal the sole bases of Brindisi and Venice, is completely controlled and impeded in its movements by an adversary holding in his possession the naval bases on the opposite coast. Nor can it be said that submarines and light torpedo-boats have divested the big ships of all value and that their time is over, for even if these latter were to disappear in a near future from the strategic and tactical field, the Fate which overtook the Roman trireme and the Venetian galley would befall on them. On the other hand, nothing forbids the supposition that the progress of science will find means of protecting the great units from torpedoes, either by defensive structures, or by perfected instruments for revealing the presence of submarines, or even for deviating the course of the torpedo on the launch, thus restoring the cannon to its former importance in naval warfare.

If Italy were at war with a non-Adriatic power, and given the neutrality of the possessor of the eastern Adriatic shore, the sole bases of Taranto and Brindisi would be inadequate to the task of closing the Adriatic against the enemy's naval forces, unless she were to



Pola - Temple of August and of Rome.
(Phot. Alinari).



Pola - The Arena.

concentrate in it a considerable portion of her fleet, which would also have to provide for the defence of all the other waters bounding the Peninsula.

Instead the possession of Valona would confer relative security to Italy even if the two aforesaid bases only contained considerably reduced forces, as the enemy would hardly attempt to force the Channel of Otranto, exposing itself to the risk of easy attacks from the submarine-craft aggregated to the two bases, unless indeed he were in such overwhelming strength as to enable him to try such a coup without endangering his superiority in the other sections of the naval conflict.

But to make this possible, the inferiority of the Italian navy should be such as to make the issue of the war a foregone conclusion. So the possession of Valona constitutes a military necessity for us, to complete and strengthen the strategical function of Brindisi.

Very different would be the case of a conflict with another Adriatic Naval Power, which, for the nonce, we will suppose as unallied to any other Mediterranean State. The occupation of Valona would, it is true, enable us to close the channel of Otranto to enemy commerce, but although that might mean an economic loss to the adversary, it would certainly not weigh heavily on the military operations, as he could always refurnish himself in other ways, either across his own

land-frontier, or (as in the case of a great Jugo-Slav State), by other possible maritime outlets.

The possession of Valona by Italy, would prevent the enemy squadrons from getting out of the Adriatic, or from getting back there once out, but in the case in point, the adversary would be unlikely to accept such a risk unless for the purpose of joining forces with a more powerful ally, and attacking us somewhere else. In which case Brindisi and Valona would be of no further use.

But as regards naval warfare within the confines of the Adriatic, the occupation of Valona would not greatly modify the condition of the Italian Navy, for Valona, like Brindisi, is completely dominated by Cattaro, from which the two aforesaid bases can be watched and every movement paralyzed.

As Brindisi and Valona are dominated by Cattaro, so Venice is dominated by Pola, in a greater measure on account of the lesser distance. Pola cuts Venice completely off from the rest of the Adriatic, excluding every possibility, apart from any other reason—which we may class under the heading of logistics—of Venice ever serving as a base for the bulk of the Italian fleet.

Operating from Pola, Sebenico, Spalato or Cattaro on the contrary, the enemy fleet, even if inferior in

number and power, would be the real and absolute master of the Adriatic, as was amply demonstrated by the raids perpetrated by the Austrian fleet against our coast during the recent war, and which not even the use of the submarine flotilla were able to prevent. And if the Austrian operations of this kind were not more frequent, the fact is due on the one hand, to a lack of aggressiveness, not always justified, on the part of the enemy, and on the other to a peculiar phase in the progress of naval technique, which gave at that precise moment an enormous superiority to submarine attacks over the opposing defence.

But this superiority will have to disappear, or the great units must vanish from the theatre of war. The problem must in one way or in another, be brought back to the terms which held it previously to the modern development of torpedo-craft, whether submarine or otherwise.

Hence the necessity for Italy to be the dominant military Power on the eastern Adriatic shore.

We now propose to consider how far it would be necessary for her to occupy it, in order to ensure relative security such as would render a future war an improbable contingency, and shall proceed by successive a series of hypotheses.

1st. *Italy occupies Pola only.*—This would alter

but slightly the actual state of things, except for the fact of our disposing of a much better naval base than Venice, for the enemy could create a large naval base at Sebenico, and an auxiliary one at Buccari, or in the sea of Novegrad, which, connected by the channels of northern Dalmatia and by the numerous points of vantage among the islands, would render Pola perhaps even more subjugated and helpless than is Venice at present (Table 2nd).

It may here be opportune to remark that Pola could in no wise constitute a safe base for us, unless endowed with a sufficiently extensive hinterland to admit a secure defense on the land-front. To obtain this the mere surrounding territory, in the proportion required say for an entrenched camp, would not be sufficient even taking into due account the means of modern warfare and the possibilities of its progress. Indeed the various requirements of a modern military port cannot be limited to, or made dependent exclusively on the sea. We should need a safe land-route connecting the port with the various productive and social centres, in a word with the heart of the Nation.

It is not for a sailor to point out what or how much territory this would necessitate, but, in the case we are considering, it must be evident, even to the man in the street, that to secure sufficient protection

for our lines of communication between Pola and the Peninsula, we should require all Istria, and all Venezia Giulia as far as the natural confines formed by the Julian Alps.

2nd. Italy holds, beside Pola, the Dalmatian Archipelago, without the adjacent coast.—Of course the conditions are initially somewhat improved: Buccari and Novegrad lose some of their value, and Pola becomes less overwhelmed. But Sebenico, Spalato and Cattaro remain as grave menaces: the movements of the enemy fleet might be partly watched and handicapped by the islands; but the possession of the islands would be wholly precarious owing to the difficulty of sending supplies, drafts and reinforcements, a difficulty which arises from the proximity of the enemy coast and from the power it exercises on the islands. The enemy, holding the coast, could very easily try to land forces on the islands and seize them: in this case we would fall back on the preceeding hypothesis.

Even if nothing of that kind should eventually happen, our coast from Ancona to Brindisi would always be exposed, as it actually is, to enemy offenses.

3rd. Besides Pola and the Dalmatian Archipelago Italy holds the coast from the extremity of the Morlacca Channel to Cape Plankā.—This arrangement would secure to Italy dominion over the northern Adriatic

from a point slightly South of Ancona to Sebenico. This town would however lose most of its value through the proximity of Spalato, an excellent base technically superior to Sebenico, and superbly protected by the islands of Zirona Solta and Brazza.

So the southern Adriatic would be under the complete dominion of the two magnificent bases: Spalato and Cattaro, even if Italy were in possession of Valona.

4th. *Besides the above Italy holds the Curzolane Islands less Brazza Solta and Zirona as was stipulated by the Treaty of London.*—The situation is not sensibly altered, as the Curzolane would be of no use to us, excepting as outposts or sentinels, certainly not as bases from which to blockade Spalato in any degree. A naval base in the Curzolane could only be formed in the Vallone of Città Vecchia, (Isle of Lesina), but besides being too close to Spalato, there would be the grave drawback of its being completely isolated from the Peninsula, communications with which could be cut off on the North from Spalato, and on the South from Cattaro. Besides, Città Vecchia would be under the fire of big guns placed on Brazza from the highest point of which the anchorage of Città Vecchia is less than 15 miles distant, the peninsula that encloses it on the North, towards Brazza, being lower than this latter.

5th. *Italy besides what was assigned to her by the Treaty*

of London, holds the entire coast from Cape Planka to the mouth of the Narenta.—This is the only practical solution of the strategical problem of the Adriatic. The Jugo-Slav State would remain in possession of the splendid naval base of Cattaro, sufficient to protect the portion of coast-line that would remain in its possession, but the dominion of the Adriatic would be sufficiently ensured to Italy, at all events in case of a war with the Balkan State or States that will have an outlet on the Adriatic, provided always, as is here presumed, that Valona remains Italian. This would be the best and only guarantee for the sistemation of the Adriatic, to prevent it becoming the cause of future wars.

Italy is no imperialist nation. Her modern history gives ample proof of this. The majority of her public opinion has always opposed even such limited colonial expansion as would really be necessary to the man-productive nation that she is, and in which the phenomenon of emigration has assumed such imposing proportions. Then what interest could she have in conquering some other morsel of Adriatic coast?

The youthful Jugo-Slav nation, instead, has already before its birth given proof of a formidable appetite. It claims nothing less than to extend its territory to the Tagliamento!

Its present manoeuvres to gain possession of the en-

tire Hapsburg fleet, in opposition to the rights of a logical proportionate distribution of the Austro-Hungarian inheritance, as well as to the agreements already concluded among the Allies, show still more clearly what a danger this State may prove in the future.


If therefore she is not rendered powerless to injure, as soon as ever she has constituted herself as a nation and regulated her internal affairs, she will presumably take steps to carry her purposes into effect, endangering thereby the peace of Europe.

What has been said in the five hypothesis considered above in case of a war with those Nations bordering on the Adriatic, holds good all the more should the said Nations be allied to another Mediterranean Power. In this case, in the best of the our five suppositions, the sole fact of Cattaro being in enemy hands, would oblige Italy to keep in the Adriatic a proportion of her fleet not inferior to the naval force owned by her Adriatic adversary, thereby considerably weakening the defences on her other coasts.

A last aspect of the problem still remains to be considered: namely the value of the military possession of the Dalmatian coast-line with regard to military defence in general, respectively for Italy and for the future Jugo-Slav State. It cannot be denied that if the latter possessed the afore said coast, its security would be per-



Fiume - The crowd cheering to Italy.



Fiume - The Italian man-of-war *E. Filiberto* at anchor in the harbour.

fect with regard to Italy, who would live under a perpetual menace and be obliged, for her safety, to maintain a much larger fleet than the Jugo-Slav's. Vice-versa in the opposite conjecture, Italy would be free from anxiety not only on sea but on land, notwithstanding the vast extension of her frontier line, which if it were established along the summit-line of the Velebiti Range and the Dinaric Alps, would be easily defensible by small forces, owing to the height of those mountains and the lack of even second-rate roads. All this is obvious, but it is also proved by the history of Venice, who for centuries, and with small forces was able to hold the coast against Hungarian and Turkish invaders.

The depression between Mount Nevoso and the Velebiti might offer a way of invasion, but it would also be easily defended. The road that runs along the Narenta valley, which would appear to be an excellent way of penetration, need not be considered, for it would run outside Italian territory if our 5th hypothesis were realized.

The same geographical features which in such a case would make our frontier safe, would offer equal security to Jugo-Slavia, so that we may, in all sincerity say, that whereas the solution clamoured for by the Southern-Slavs would constitute a perpetual menace for Italy and peace, that which Italy demands is the only one offering reliable guarantee for the future tranquillity of Europe.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM.

To arrive to a synthetic understanding of so complex a problem as that displayed in this period of deep political upheaval of all the regions that form the background of the Adriatic, one must first acquire a clear notion of the economic function of this sea, as it was up to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.

The commercial hinterland of the Adriatic consisted then in the Italian peninsula on the West, and the Balkan on the East, while on the North it was formed by Astro-Hungary and the greater part of Germany.

At first sight it would appear as though the proximity of the two shores ought to have favoured active commercial relations between Italy and the Balkan peninsula, whereas in reality various reasons have hitherto hindered this.

When in 1870 Italy became a Nation she had to start everything *ab imis fundamentis*. Commerce and industries scarcely existed, so that notwithstanding the truly marvellous stride realized, she had not yet been able to compete with the more advanced and far more prosperous Nations which, disposing of abundant production, flooded the Balkans with their goods availing themselves of the maritime routes (although far longer),

as well as of the northern land-routes. In addition, the imperviousness of the Velebiti and the Dinarics, the lack of good ports on the Albanian coast, and the incompleteness of the road system, made it extremely difficult for young Italy to succeed in her attempts at penetration into the Balkans, nor was she strong enough economically to promote the building of a railway system across Balkania, while the Central Empires were financing lines of penetration from North to South.

This explains the almost total lack of the natural, normal functions of the Adriatic, the feasibility of which is proved by what little Italy has found the energy to effect in recent years: namely, the harbour-works at Antivari, the navigation on the Boiana, and establishment of somewhat important exchanges between Bari and the Montenegrine and Albanian coasts besides the projected railway from Antivari to the interior, not to mention for the present our efforts toward colonization in Albania.

As a connecting-link between Central Europe and the Orient, the Adriatic fully retained its functions, some peculiar aspects of which deserve a retrospective survey.

During her prime, Venice enjoyed the monopoly of this vast commercial stream to and from Central Europe, while Genoa was the emporium for the western States.

Trieste, father North, made fruitless efforts to compete

with Venice, who, jealously watchful over the principal source of her splendid prosperity, wished to reserve for herself the sole right of navigation in what she proudly termed the "Gulf of Venice". To attain this end she used every means in her power, not escluding arms.

But the decay of oar-navigation, together with the discoveries of Vasco de Gama and Columbus dealt a death-blow to Adriatic trade, so that the chief source of the Serenissima's wealth began to ebb and with it the political fortunes of the glorious old Republic, while England, Holland, the Hanseatic League, etc., etc., divided the spoils.

Later on, the advent of steam-navigation, and the opening of the Suez Canal, restored the Adriatic to its former importance, but then Venice and Trieste were under the yoke of the Hapsburgs, who, recognizing the better position of Trieste with regard to the hinterland of the northern Adriatic, endowed it with a good artificial port granting it franchise privileges etc. etc., to the detriment of Venice. Thus began the marvellous development of the port of Trieste, second in the Mediterranean only to Marseilles and Genoa.

Not satisfied with this the Austro-Hungarian government constructed the port of Fiume, as an emporium for Hungary and the adjoining regions completing it with the necessary railway lines.

Germany with her growing trade and industrial progress, proved a powerful factor in the commercial development of Trieste, which relieved her North-Sea ports from the danger of congestions and competition.

Founded in Trieste, the "Austro-Hungarian Lloyd", a solid Company subsidized by the State, started trading with the Orient and succeeded in driving the Italian flag from those waters after a brief struggle, and in overrunning the Far-East with full and deserved success.

The "Croato-Hungarian Company" and the "Adria", to mention only the more prominent and recent Firms, were founded in Fiume, and giving birth to more ambitious designs, became the "Austro-American Company", with a view of competing in the two Americas with the Italian Navigation Companies.

Naval industries arose simultaneously keeping pace with the progress of the above-mentioned Companies. Thus the Triestine Technical Establishment (Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino) formerly "San Marco", the San Rocco and the Lloyd Dockyards, the Monfalcone Naval Dockyard, together with the industries of Fiume, amongst which the important Dockyard "Vulcan", so that, with the attraction of an immense hinterland, these two ports absorbed the bulk of Levantine trade to the exclusion of Italy, powerless to compete with such formidable rivals.

So, while Trieste and Fiume waxed prosperous to the advantage of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the efforts of Venice to recover even partially her place in the Adriatic were brought to nought.

With an hinterland limited almost exclusively to the plain of Lombardy, having to cope with German and Austrian commercial methods, the results of which are notorious, insufficiently financed and not disposing of overproduction in anything like the proportions of Germany, Venice struggled in vain.

The Venetian Navigation Company endeavoured to compete with the Lloyd, at least in the Far-East, but with indifferent success.

Another attempt was the navigation on the Po; but at the outbreak of the war, it was not yet completed and in any case would only have furthered Venetian trade, in the matter of exchanges with the hinterland, and certainly not appreciably influenced eastern traffic.

So Italy, who at one time owned the absolute monopoly of Levantine trade, so much so that her language and dialects echoed along all the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, now found herself completely shut out from these ports and obliged to turn her energies towards western traffic, where the field was already occupied by more advanced and more powerful Nations than herself, without being able to overcome their redoubtable competition.

Beside the far-reaching main stream of traffic, we must note an important local current between Trieste, Fiume and the Istrian and Dalmatian ports. Seeing that the two latter regions have no communication with the interior of Balkania where they could not find the products they needed, nor on the other hand a market for their own exportation, it was only natural that all their trading should take place by sea. So the Custom-House barrier between Austria and Italy was organized in such a way as to focus all traffic in the two chief ports of the Monarchy, just the contrary of what happened when the Adriatic was styled the Gulf of Venice.

A cross-current of maritime trade really did exist: a certain number of small steamers plied between Ravenna, Ancona, Bari and the opposite shore, while sailing vessels, mostly Dalmatian, traded in low-priced goods, chiefly timber, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bari in particular, by her "Puglia" Line, took a very creditable share in promoting these dealings, as did Venice in starting the Antivary port and railway works, interrupted in their initial stage by the war. So Italy drew little or no profit from this sea, while Austria-Hungary and Germany reaped all the benefits it was capable of yielding.

The Balkan States may be said not to have con-

cerned themselves at all about the Adriatic, and this for various reasons, first among which, though by no means the most important, because not insurmountable, the lack of easy ways of access to the coast. In reality though, because of the settled purpose of the Central Empires, more specially Germany, to drain the resources of all their neighbours.

To this end they promoted and financed a complete railway system in the Balkan States, aiming directly at penetration into those regions, and ultimately across Turkey to the Persian Gulf. This system stretches lengthwise, with one single branch-line ending at Fiume, a necessary outlet for Hungary.

They dreaded that cross-lines, linking up the Dalmatian, Montenegrine and Albanian ports with the rest of Balcania, should lead to dangerous competition on the part of Italy, so took care to thwart every attempt of the kind however unambitious. On the other hand the Balkans peoples could only view the latter tendency with favour, since it brought them into contact with Nations far more highly developed as regards commerce and industry than Italy. In any case they had to make a virtue of necessity and bear it as best they might, because of the perpetual military threat suspended over them by their mighty neighbours of the North.

Russia, too, with her vast export trade in grain

and raw goods, the natural protectress of all Slavs, yet subjected herself to Teutonic influence, was in favour of this longitudinal railway system, while the only Balkan nation that through race affinity and secular traditions would instinctively have preferred Italian economic influence to any other, Rumania, was, owing to her magnificent water-ways, put in direct contact with the Black-Sea on one side and Hungary on the other, while her geographical position removed her from her land of origin.

Having now given a rough sketch of what the economic function of the Adriatic was in recent pre-war years, both in this sea and in relation to the countries forming its hinterland, we shall now proceed to consider how it may be altered by the results of the mighty upheaval just come to a close. Already while we write, the main lines of the forthcoming situation begin to take shape and may be summed up as follows:

Profund prostration of Germany's military industrial and economic power with possibly a break-up of the union among the States that formed the Empire. Collapse of Russia. Annihilation of Austria-Hungary. Within the immense territory that was Russia, new Nations are coming into life, while the bolshevik chaos in some, and the unwisdom of the Government in others, treading on the heels of the corruption and incapacity of the

Tsar's bureaucracy, are already leading back to a condition that I might define as pre-civil, in which no effort towards economic expansion can take place, not even to the extent of exporting the untold natural resources of the country.

Austria-Hungary is already falling asunder. The more cultured part of it, the German part, whether it unites, or not, with Germany, is doomed like it, to an enormous falling off in expansive energy, and will in any case be out-distanced from the Adriatic, and the Balkans by the new States which have inherited its southern districts.

Hungary, reduced to its purely Magyar lands, cut off from the sea by Croatia on the one side and by Rumania and Ukraine on the other, will become one of the second-rate European States, yet after its recent reverses, it is not easy to see what power of expansion will remain to her.

The Czeco-Slovak State, young and vigorous, comprises one of the chief industrial districts of the ex-Hapsburg Monarchy, and has already given proof of a marvellous faculty for organization. So we have good grounds for believing that it will presently constitute wholesome, active, internal regulations. It lacks however an outlet to the sea, for which it must depend on some friendly neighbour.

Then we shall have probably a State which will



Admiral Millo, first governor of Italian Dalmatia, lands at Zara.



Zara - The crowd cheers admiral Millo.

result from a Federation of Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro. This is perhaps the darkest enigma in the whole situation. Unquestionably the survey of its components leaves no doubt as to its being essentially on the threshold of modern civilization. It may contain great latent resources, but, especially at first, it will not be capable of drawing any profit from them. It will lack the requisites for any vast industrial enterprise: plentiful capital and a good network of roads and railways, but above all sound, fair handed administration, joined to a régime of order and true liberty. Everything will have to be brought into being: agriculture is in the rudimentary phase; industrie, in the modern sense of the word, may scarcely be said to exist; commerce too, is much more local than foreign.

To develop and prosper, it will need, like all other Balkan States, the help of Nations with more powerful financial means.

By the side of these States, a larger and more powerful Italy, youthful too, though matured by the fearful but victorious trial she has just experienced, will be able, with small effort, to deflect from war like to peace purposes, all those industries to which the hard necessities of war gave a powerful and almost marvellous impulse. The losses she has suffered in human life have left her undaunted: she has been in the past, and always

will be, a great man-producing race; and will in a short time be able to fill up the painful gaps.

Her agricultural labourers, artisans and miners, will shortly spread over the world again, not guided as heretofore by foreign engineers and for the benefit of foreign capital, but, to a great extent at least, to the exclusive profit of our national interests.

This is the novel aspect of the Adriatic hinterland. How will the function of that sea be affected from an economic stand point? What are the conditions necessary for the production of all its benefits?

At first sight one might be inclined to think the break-up of the Central Empires, and the political barrier that will intervene between Trieste (the question of Fiume will be treated elsewhere) and its hinterland, would bring about a falling-off in the stream of traffic coming up the Adriatic. We shall show that this could only happen in case of an unwise Custom-house policy on the part of Italy, that is, if she were to convert the political frontier into a Customs-barrier, *quod Dî advertant*; we may trust to the sagacity of our Statesmen to avoid such a blunder. We would remark first of all, that a considerable share of the traffic of Trieste comes from Istria and Dalmatia ⁽¹⁾, which goes to prove

(1) In 1913 the tonnage that entered the port of Trieste on board merchant ships was 5,480,074 of which 2,014,200 from Istria and Dalmatia,

how closely the fate of this latter is bound up with Trieste and Venezia-Giulia. This stream must therefore flow on, especially if these three regions remain comprised in the same State.

Fiume is in similar condition, as far as her ties with Dalmatia are concerned, and this fact would be a very strong reason for its union with Italy, if there were not many others.

But beyond all this, to what ports should these regions converge that heretofore made use of Trieste, if not to Trieste itself, even now that she has passed out of their political sphere? And is not Genoa the port of Switzerland and Antwerp of Germany in spite of the Customs-limit? This same Custom-house barrier was the scarecrow which Austria was for ever brandishing before the people of Trieste in the hope of making them loyal; but as it had no effect upon their minds, it will have in reality none on their commerce. Besides, the Trieste merchants had good customers in the Levantine ports and influential colonies there, so that as soon as peace conditions are settled they will easily resume their former dealings. Wise legislation regulating the Customs and merchant marine services, will do much to promote this restoration, unless indeed the worst of

that which cleared it 5,775,445 of which 2,015,200 bound for Istria and Dalmatia (Mario Alberti, *Trieste e la sua fisiologia economica*, pag. 9).

mishaps were to overtake Trieste: that Fiume should be handed over to a Nation other than Italy. Whether that other Nation were Hungary with Croatia annexed to it, or Croatia aggregated to Greater Serbia, it would be very difficult, not to say impossible, for her new owner to protect Fiume against Austro-Hungarian and German influence. No effort would then be spared, by finance and railway construction, to make Fiume an Austro-German Port, thus withdrawing from Trieste a fair amount of her trafic. Apart from the general damage that would result to Mediterranean economy from a fresh Teutonic intrusion in these waters, and apart from the political danger of the new State getting into the sphere of German influence, apart even from the enormous injury it would inflict on Italy (a small matter to those who dread her competition), the fact remains that Fiume herself would not be much benefitted by it.

Fiume, if Italian, would still retain the hinterland formed by the Czeco-Slovak State, by Croatia, Slavonia, Hungary, and, as we shall presently see, other and vaster horizons may open to it, unless Italy's sagacity proves inferior to her luck. So there is no need for the alms of the Teutons.

The Jugo-Slavs say they need Fiume as a sea-outlet for Croatia; to which we at once observe that in 1912 the total figure for traffic there, import and export,

amounted to 3,822,183 tons, in which Croatia only figures for 4 %. For so small a trade, the ports on the Morlacca Canal are more than sufficient, even allowing for a considerable increase. Moreover one of the principal centre of the Croatian Railway system, Ogulin, is much nearer to Segna than to Fiume. And even if the future Great Jugo-Slavia should have bigger sea trade and maritime needs, she will be in a position to enlarge the port of Sedna and she will always dispose of the southern Adriatic ports between the Narenta and the Albanian frontier, where Cattaro lies, to mention only the principal one. For the rest we shall see that Italy will have every interest in favouring exchanges between all the Balkan peoples and between them and the other Nations.

The stream of traffic coming up the Adriatic will therefore continue to be what it was before the European conflict. It will even increase, firstly because of the fresh energies that will not fail to arise, then through the lessened amount of competition on the longitudinal Balkan railways and finally owing to the revival of trade and industry in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Commercial relations across the Adriatic, between Italy and Balkania, must on the other hand awake to new and exuberant life. Apart from the trade always kept up between Dalmatia and Italian ports, stands the

fact that the Balkan peoples, having only now reached the threshold of modern civilization, exhausted by long and bloody wars, will need everything: capital, all kind of products, manufactured goods, skilled and other labour, with directing personal for large industrial concerns; in a word they will be dependent on more advanced and financially more solid Nations. In the North, instead of powerful Teutonic organization and Russian help, they will find no other concrete centre of economic and cultural expansion, and they will be in contact only with defeated people and with the States arising from the ruins of the Tsar's Empire, thus repeating the situation recorded in history during the Roman Empire, when, having the barbarians on the North, civilization and wealth could only come from the West: Italy, and from the East: Bisantium, with this difference however that Bisantium is no longer existing.

At that time all the great ways of communication in Balkania ran crosswise, ending in the Adriatic ports, first of all that via Egnazia, which by Durazzo (anc. Dyracchium) linked up Rome, Brindisi and Salonika with Bisantium and Asia Minor.

So Italy will, once more, be offered the opportunity and the possibility of developing Balkania economically and industrially, pouring into it the overflow of her production, of her labour, of her capital, thanks

to her practical energies, multiplied by the war-needs, at the same time refurnishing herself of those raw material she lacks. She must therefore start at once her penetration by rail, on the transversal scheme so fully discussed even before the war. Nor would the enterprise prove so big as might at first sight appear. As a start, two branches would suffice. A first from Valona to Durazzo, touching the Monastir-Salonika line at Elbassan; a second from Antivari to Pristina by Cettigne, (or better Scutari), and then on by Novi-Bazar to Nish, where it would join the main down-line: Belgrado-Sofia-Adrianopoli-Constantinople. And finally the completion of the railway system heading at Fiume by the transformation to normal gauge of the branch lines of the Fiume-Serajevo railway which are still of a small gauge.

Nor is this all. When the Po will have been made navigable, it will be easily connected with a great Balkan river-system formed by the Save and Danubie, through the ports of Venice and Trieste, or Fiume, by a short railway-line from Trieste to Karlstadt on the Kulpa, or even to Sussek on the Save. By these means the industrial centre of Italy would be united to Balkania and the Black-Sea, by the least expensive mode of transport, which fact would enable us to win any competition. The problem would thus obtain a perfect

solution, if we can succeed in avoiding transfer, which might be effected by using especially constructed barges to be taken up the course of the rivers by steam-tugs from the centre of Lombardy to the Isonzo, there to be lifted bodily on two railway trucks provided with *ad hoc* fittings, thus reaching the Kulpa or the Save, from whence again by river to the Black Sea. Thus goods loaded in Lombardy or Piedmont, would go to and from the Black Sea, without transfer and at trifling cost. Anyone can see what a source of wealth this magnificent commercial route would prove, not only for Italy, but also for the Balkans (Table 5th.).

With the building of the aforesaid transversal railways, and the fluvial line, the Adriatic would become the natural maritime outlet of Balkania, and a continual stream of traffic would flow towards it. Italy could also export her wine, her fruit, clothes, metal and chemical produce, while she could import from Balkania, coal, petrol, iron, lead, wood, etc. By the fluvial line Italy could also import cereals and petrol from Rumania, Bessarabia, Southern Russia and Caucasus.

Balkan peoples have all to gain in this proposed relation with Italy, considering that the transport expenses would be lower from Italy than from any other country. Neither would they have to fear any menace of imperialism in this colonization work. Besides, Italy

being the less favoured among the great Powers, her exportation to the Balkans would be in a larger way compensated by her imports, than would be the case with any other nation.

But to make all this feasible, it is necessary for Italy to fully control the eastern shore of the Adriatic, so as to ensure peace, and also for irreducible economical reasons.

Firstly, the new Balkan nation could not dispose, at least in the beginning, of sufficient means to carry on the necessary harbour-works and the building of transversal railways. Neither could they ask for help from other Nations, who would not find it convenient. It can be foreseen that some of them would oppose, in their own interest, any like attempt. Further, to avoid any possible loss of energy it would be necessary that all the transversal railway lines of penetration in the Balkans, were in the hands of the same Nation, which, undoubtedly must be the one in possession of Trieste. Otherwise dangerous competition would arise between harbour and harbour, and the transversal railways would not always follow the shortest and most economical route. It is thus better illustrated the necessity of Fiume becoming Italian; also in the interest of the new States rising from the wreck of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This applies chiefly to the Czech-Slovak State and

to Hungary. The interest of both Nations requires that Fiume should be left in the hands of a power economically strong, rather than in those of a newly formed State, as Jugo-Slavia, who could not be trusted to be capable of exploiting the harbour with modern methods and adequate means. This will also apply to all other neighbouring States constituting the hinterland of Fiume and Trieste, provided that the latter are made free-ports, which we believe to be necessary in the interest of both Italy and the other aforesaid Nations.

There is no reason to dread the financial damage which could derive to Italy, as the diminished custom duties would be largely made good by the great receipts which would accrue to her, because of the great increase in the trade, and subsequent development of industry. There would also be other revenues, as anchorage duties, taxes on income and capital, custom duties on raw material and manufactured goods, apart from the general increase in public wealth.

We have thus examined the economical problem of the Adriatic, in its general lines, but we need also take into account some particular features of it, for instance its importance from a Dalmatian point of view. We have already seen how this province depends economically from Fiume and Trieste, and how these two harbours would greatly lose their importance, if a

Custom-house barrier was to cut them off from Dalmatia. Neither is it likely that this eminently maritime country might become economically dependent from the remnant Balkania. To gain this end, it would be necessary to build transversal railways linking with others running lengthwise, thus uniting the principal maritime centres one with the other, and all with Fiume and Cattaro. Austria, who always favoured the economical development of her lands, had no reasons whatever of isolating Dalmatia. Yet, she vainly attempted to resolve both problems, and was bound to direct by sea her traffic to and from Dalmatia. She probably thought that linking Dalmatia by railway to Bosnia-Erzegovina, she would further Italian interests, to the detriment of her policy of penetration in the Balkans. She must certainly have given up the idea also because of the material difficulties of the enterprise, caused by the arduous task of crossing the impervious mountain region of the Dinariche Alps. It is quite true that modern engineering would succeed in overcoming even greater difficulties; yet the fact remains that, under existing conditions, it would hardly be profitable to attempt such an enterprise, given the limited local traffic. Then the peculiar geographical conditions of the country do not allow the most important transversal Balkan railway to end in Dalmatia.

The Metkovich-Serajevo railway, which follows the course of the Narenta, is absolutely excentric with respect to the country we are speaking of, and it could not serve its purpose.

The railway uniting Sebënico to Spalato, reaches Kuin, then continues for a while at a smaller gauge, but does not join the main Balkan railway line. It is not, and never can be, sufficient to supply the whole of Dalmatia. It was built chiefly with the idea of providing a means of transport for the industries of those two towns, and uniting their harbours with their hinterlands this side of the Dinaric Alps, and also for military reasons.

The building of a longitudinal, coastal railway from Fiume to Cattaro, is a hard task. Besides it would only partly and imperfectly solve the problem of supplying Dalmatia by land. As a country bound to live on importation, she will always be dependant from the sea, and it is thus obvious what damage would befall her if she were not united to the Nation in possession of Trieste and Fiume, while she would greatly improve on her ante-bellum conditions, were she united to Italy together with the aforesaid harbours, thus abolishing the Custom-house barrier, which greatly weighed on her relations with Bari, Ancona and Venice.

Neither can it rightly be said that in the systemation

proposed by Jugo-Slavia Fiume at least would remain united to Dalmatia, as Fiume alone cannot be sufficient to the needs of that country. When we think that Dalmatia under Austrian rule strongly felt her separation from Italy, whose produce she needed, and where she could have exported timber, cement, coal, etc., in larger proportions.

The possession of Dalmatia, instead, would not represent for Jugo-Slavia the great benefit she pretends. This coastal region could give her nothing she does not already possess, except perhaps cement. Owing to the difficult communications, her natural harbours on the Adriatic must be in the North those situated in the Morlacca Canal, in the South: the mouth of the Narenta and Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and at the farthest Durazzo. In no case Sebenico, Spalato and Zara.

As a Custom-house barrier will have to exist between Jugo-Slavia and Italy, it is of no consequence whether it is established on the coast or on the Dinaric watershed.

The friendly intercourse between the two peoples, cemented by the military security of Italy, would greatly lessen the effects of the said barrier, promoting a policy of commercial accord in the interest of both.

Another problem, though less important, is that of the economical ties between Sebenico and Spalato.

These two harbours, already united by railway, form almost a single industrial centre, fed by the hydraulic force of the Kerka and of the Cotina, or from the Clay caves, so that but one railway unites them to the interior. They have industries and interests in common, the most important being that of the clay caves, which yeald a superior quality of clay, from which is made a first class cement of the Portland type. For this reason, it would be ruinous to raise a Custom-house barrier between those two towns, assigning Sebenico to Italy and Spalato to Jugo-Slavia.

As Italy, for most important strategical reasons could not renounce to Sebenico, she ought to obtain also possession of Spalato, thus bringing the confine to the mouth of the Narenta.

To Jugo-Slavia would be left the outlets to the sea of the Morlacca Canal in the North; Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno and Cattaro in the South.

Having examined in general lines the complex economical problem of the Adriatic and its hinterland, we may conclude that the changes brought about by the present war can but increase the importance of the economical function of this sea, which will become a source of inestimable riches for the peoples who will use it as a trade-route, provided that its political systemation fulfills the following conditions:

1st. To offer—as far as humanly possible—a security that naval competitions will not endanger peace.

2nd. The principal sea-outlets of the great communication lines—either longitudinal, uniting Central Europe to the Orient, or transversal, linking the two shores of the Adriatic—to be placed in the hands of the same Nation.

3rd. To prevent that Germanism—the present crisis overcome—should take up again its "drang-nach-Osten" programme, and make its influence felt again in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, directly or through States not possessing the power of opposing its penetration.

We believe to have sufficiently demonstrated that the only solution fulfilling all these conditions, is the one satisfying all the just aspirations of Italy: *i. e.*: Trieste, Fiume, Dalmatia up to the Narenta and Valona. This is the only Adriatic systemation which could guarantee peace, offer the same economical benefits once enjoyed by Rome and Venice, and cut off Germany completely from the Balkan market. Any other compromise, as the annexation of Fiume and Spalato to Jugo-Slavia, would entail the danger of these two harbours, chiefly Fiume, falling economically in German hands. In this case, Germany would again endeavour to frustrate all efforts aiming at developing commercial

intercourse between Italy and the Balkan peoples. This would be a grave misfortune not only for Italy but for all Mediterranean Nations, who have everything to fear from German competition, and thus one of the most important war-aims for which the Entente Powers have borne so many sacrifices, would fail.

We have no doubt that the Peace Conference will newly sanction our aspirations, already acknowledged in the Treaty of London, completing them in such a way as to give a harmonic, just and safe solution to the Adriatic problem.



Zara - Front view of the Cathedral.



Zara - The *Terracotta* door.

ALBANIA.

The Albanian Nation constitutes a distinct and well defined ethnical unit that has nothing in common with the other Balkanian peoples. Like the Basques, the Bretons and the Scottish Celts, the Albanians are among the most ancient peoples in Europe and may with good right consider themselves autochthonous. Belonging to the Thraco-Illyrian family, they inhabited in remotest time the greater part of the Balkanian peninsula: that is Dalmatia, part of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Sangiacate of Novi-Bazar, Western Macedonia, Albania of to-day, Epirus and Thessaly. The Romans knew and fought them under the domination of Illyrians in the North, of Epirotes in the South, (wars of Pyrrhus, King of Epirus and Illyrian wars), and turned their territory into Roman Provinces. Then the successive Barbaric Invasion reduced little by little the territory occupied by the Albanians, who gathered into that stretch of Adriatic coast-land comprised between Cattaro and the Gulf of Arta, preserving throughout, however, their racial imprint, though modified by the Roman domination.

In contact with the Bulgarians and Slavs on the East and the Greeks on the South, they had however

to undergo the gradual influx of groups of these populations who settled on their soil; more especially in the South, in Epirus, the southern portion of which is now prevalently Greek, stray groups of these outsiders thus pushing as far as Santi Quaranta, Delfino, Argirocastro, Colonia, Coritza and into Chimara (Table 6th.).

In the North, the Slav influx has confined itself to Montenegro and, in much smaller proportions, to the environs of Scutari. Similarly, groups of Albanians have remained behind in the lands they formerly occupied, more or less numerous and compact in proportion to their vicinity to Albania proper.

Living a pastoral life in the Pindus region as in the district of Coritza, Premeti and Berat, there are over a hundred thousand Walachians or Rumanians whose Latin descent is plainly evidenced by the language, traditions customs and physiological characteristics. Among these, the dwellers in the Coritza, Premeti and Berat districts, and in parts of Macedonia and Thessaly too, are known under the name of Pharsalictes, and are believed to be nothing less than the descendants of the Roman colonists that settled in that region after the battle of Pharsalia.

Geographically speaking, Albania is a mountainous inaccessible region, furrowed by deep valleys through which flow rivers which have become torrential as the

result of displacement and the indifference of the late Ottoman Government towards any public works tending to the regulation of water-courses. Near the coast, where the general lie of the land is flat, owing to the same general causes, marsh and malaria hold sovereign sway.

The same thriftless unconcern, has resulted in the almost total absence of a good system of roadways. The only one practicable in its total extent throughout the year—that from Santi Quaranta to Delvino, Han Halibaka, Colonia, Coritza with the Argirocastro, Tepeleni and Premeti branches,—was found by us at the time of our occupation (1916) in a deplorable condition. (Table 6th.).

Along the coast there are no ports worthy of the name San Giovanni di Medua, Durazzo and Santi Quaranta, are mere open roadsteads, more or less exposed to the shoreward winds, and more or less capacious, but all totally unfit for any commercial use.

Agriculture is absolutely primitive and greatly hindered by the marshes in the more even reaches, and by the absence of humus on the mountain-slopes.

Pasturage is the sole profit derived from the soil to any extent, and is chiefly in the hands of Rumanians; there are no industries, nor any commerce worth mentioning; fishing is only practised extensively in the productive fishery of Butruito.

This state of things is made worse by the natural temperament of the people themselves: a primitive race divided into clans, often engaged in bloody feuds among themselves, bullied by the local lordlings, the Beys, chosen for them by Turkey.

The country is therefore a very poor one though by no means destitute of natural resources. First of all, agriculture might take much larger proportions and intensity, if the marsh-lands were drained, the mountains covered with woods, and modern methods of culture introduced. By a judicious regulation of the water-system, the rivers might yield a considerable and continuous amount of hydraulic power. The subsoil, almost unexplored, may reveal untold resources if we are to judge by the bitumen-pits at Selenitza, and some recent subsoil sampling-operations attended with promising results.

To convert the natural resources of the country into wealth, a series of public works must be set on foot to reclaim the marshes, re-timber the mountains, put the roads and highways into proper order, and improve the ports. Here we would remind the reader how, in Roman times, Albania was traversed by one of the most important arteries of the Empire: the Via Egnatia, which, starting from Durazzo (Dyracchium), crossed the Cavaia plain to the Skumbi, followed the valley of this river, rose on the slopes of the Candavian range,



then along the edge of the Devoli ravine, to Heraclea in the Macedonian Centre, and finally, through Thracia, reaching Constantinople (Table 6th.). This was the mighty military and commercial highway which continuing, across the Adriatic, by the Via Appia at Brindisi, united the Italian Peninsula and Rome to the East of Europe. This track ought to be followed by a vast railway artery, which would restore the ancient Roman highway to its primitive economical function. This would be the Durazzo-Monastir railroad, described in a preceding chapter on the economic problem of the Adriatic, where we saw what advantages might result from it for Italy and the Balkan lands.

At Elbassan it ought to meet a branch-line from Valona, which plan would present the double advantage of linking up that port, and of constituting with the Durazzo-Elbassan-Monastir line the first nucleus of an Albanian railway-system.

The harbour of Durazzo, at present no more than a mere open unsheltered roadstead, should be turned into an absolutely secure port, answering in every respect to modern requirements; the old Roman port, too, on the adjacent lake should be restored by a process of judicious and gradual dredging. True, these harbour works would entail a considerable outlay, but we consider that in view of the enterprise could not fail to become productive in a very short time.

Valona will never be able to compete seriously with Durazzo, for if it were to be Albania's chief commercial port, the outlay required for it would be infinitely greater than for Durazzo, the railway stretch longer, and the local conditions much less favourable, if it were only for the high winds prevailing there: Valona must be above all a naval base and military port.

If all this comes to pass, it is clear that a new era of prosperity will open for this unhappy country, not only because of the considerable transit-trade flowing along the Great-Balkania cross-artery that will cross it, but also because of the facilities it will afford for exporting the products of such industries as the hydraulic power available will warrant founding, and those accruing from possible and probable mining industries, besides the agricultural and forestal produce.

Now the above projects could not be carried into effect by the sole resources of Albania itself, too impoverished and politically unprepared to stand alone after so many centuries of servitude and ill-government, especially if we consider the pressure being brought to bear upon it by the neighbouring States, threatening its very existence.

Albania, therefore, would require the assistance of a strong Nation more advanced than herself, that would have no interest in furthering the ambitions of Greece or Serbia.

For this reason the Albanians have grown used to looking upon Italy as their true and only protectress, while they have for centuries been longing to obtain political independence, a thing they consider not incompatible with a mild form of protectorate on the part of the Italian State.

A lively Austrian propaganda, pursued on the usual unscrupulous lines habitual to that Government, chiefly by means of the clergy, and particularly in the northern districts, had indeed yielded notable results through the mirage of the greater political and economic might of the Danubian Empire, leading a strong party to prefer Austrian protectorate to ours. The Prince of Wied's fleeting rule was the exponent of this tendency. But after the Serbian defeat and the fall of Montenegro, the occupation by Austria of the whole country down to the Voyussa, having afforded these populations a sample of Austrian methods of rule, as compared with ours in the South, proved the very best antidote for the results of the previous propaganda, and when the Italian troops crossed the Voyussa, towards the close of 1918, the Albanian population hailed them as deliverers, and large bands of armed citizens co-operated in driving the imperial troops off Albanian soil. Friendly relations are however no novelty between Italians and Albanians, whole clans having settled peaceably in Italy,

where they live in villages of their own, unmolested and happy, retaining their language, manners customs and traditions, while evincing their gratitude towards the adopted country by their unwavering loyalty and by sincere efforts to promote a friendly feeling towards us among their country-men on the opposite shore.

Notwithstanding the division into tribes often in conflict with one another, and in spite of some racial differences between northern and southern tribes, due to contact with peoples differing widely from them such as the Greeks and Serbians, the Albanians have preserved their racial and historical unity intact, and possess traditions of their own that distinguish them from their neighbours. In spite therefore of internal feuds, and although its primitive instincts recoil from even such restrictions as are inseparable from a wholesome State constitution, this small but valiant people has always aspired to independence, and it is only fair that they should obtain it now that the map of Europe is about to be revised.

The Wilsonian principles now adhered to by all the Powers must also be applied to Albania, lest Greek and Serbian ambition should divide the land between them. Italian protectorate will be nothing more for Albania than a guarantee of life and prosperity, a life-insurance against accidents embodied in a perpetual menace of military or pacific invasion by the two neighbouring States.

This protectorate, necessary to insure Albania's independence and economic prosperity, is also indispensable to her in order that she may have a ordered and liberal government, for the people, as we have already remarked, though by no fault of their own, are for the present lacking in the ethical and social preparation for complete self-government, a defect freely admitted by the Albanians themselves.

Italy, owing to her vicinity and long sequence of moral cultural and economic dealings, would appear to be the Nation best fitted to exert this civilizing influence.

The occupation of Valona, necessary to Italy's security, which has now been sanctioned by the European Powers, is a further reason for confiding to her the task of leading Albania towards her new destinies, for in this case there will be no real disjunction of this small portion of her soil from the remanent of Albania, who will experience no evil consequences from it, either economic or military.

Italy on the other hand could not allow another Power, even though Mediterranean, to be installed on the Adriatic, the danger resulting to her from such a contingency being too evident to need illustration.

Should Serbian and Greek views however prevail over the Italian aspirations, and Albania be divided between those two States, there can be no doubt

whatever that the Albanians, as a people, would be doomed to disappear before long, the sole survivors being the groups settled in Italy. The Balkanian methods of denationalization are notorious, and if they have produced the results we all know in Macedonia and New Serbia, where the oppressed elements were sustained by the vicinity of the mother-countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey), how much speedier would be the process in Albania completely abandoned to herself.

Besides, neither Serbia nor Greece could better than Italy turn to rapid profit the natural resources of the region, or carry into effect the projects mentioned above, so that we are justified in asserting that even from the standpoint of general economy, the Italian protectorate of Albania offers undeniable advantages.

Having proved Albania's right to independence, and the desirability of the Italian protectorate, we must pass on to examine the question of the confines of the new State, such as they ought to be.

The London Conference of 1913-1914 fixed the frontiers of the Albanian State, allotting it a surface of 28,000 square kilom., with a population of 800,000 inhabitants in round figures. To tell the truth the Albanian patriots had hoped for far better things. They would have wished the new State to annex the four ex-Turkish vilayets of Scutari, Janina, Cossovo, and



Sebenico - A portal of the Cathedral.



Traù - Panorama.

Monastir, some even wanting part of that of Salonika, which would have brought the surface of Albania to about 92.200 square kilometers, with a population of over two millions and a half. Such aspirations are of course excessive, for although the confines established by the London Conference manifestly do not include the whole Albanian family, still it is a fact that beyond them, the groups of the nationality are more thinly spread, according as the distance increases between them and the central nucleus formed by the State itself, gradually dwindling to a negligible quantity. But though the pretensions of the fieriest Albanian Nationalists are in the main unfounded, still the frontier fixed by the London Conference certainly falls short of what Albania might with perfect right have expected from Europe's sense of equity. Serbian and Greek imperialism, aided by French and English philhellenism, fostered by classical memories, made the Greek views prevail, whereas it would have been only fair that the vilajet of Janina in which the Albanian and Rumanian elements are still largely prevalent, should have been allotted to Albania, thus allowing her to breathe more freely. However, it would probably be too late to correct the error, since Greece has been in possession of that vilajet for some years, and has started that process of de-nationalization which cannot fail to modify its racial character before long.

Some of the errors, however, committed in tracing the Albanian-Greek frontier ought absolutely to be corrected now that Europe is about to re-construct her political map, and first of all that of having assigned to Greece the Pindus region, populated by compact masses of Rumanians who have a distinct horror of Greek rule, and want to be united to Albania.

The Walachian population that has always lived on friendly terms with the Albanians, would view with the highest satisfaction the protectorate of Italy, whom they have always looked upon as their natural protectress. They would thus obtain a guarantee for their interests, and for the integrity of their nationality. They do not forget the constant interest Italy has shown in their concerns, and how on various occasions she obtained concessions in their favour from the Sublime Porte, so much so that in 1913 they addressed a memorandum to the Marchese di San Giuliano couched in the following terms:

"Firm in the consciousness of their Latin origin, and in the determination to preserve together with their historical existence the very reason of their being and of their mission of activity and civilization, upwards of one hundred thousand Rumanians, scattered over forty villages in the region of the Pindus, implore the generous intervention of the Italian Government, so that, at the

moment in which their fate as a Nation is about to be decided, they may not be condemned to certain ruin without the succour of the sole Power that can speak authoritatively in the name of our common mother Rome.

" Let Italy that has advocated the cause of Albanian nationality with such power and authority, know that her mission is not yet finished. If the principle just established in London, marks a succes for Italian Diplomacy, the tracing of this new frontier, can, if Italy will it, mark a victory for the Latin race. Situated between the two terms of the frontier fixed in London, between Stilo and Coritza, in the name of that principle of nationality of which Italy has ordained herself the champion and partisan, by the famous plebiscites of her political constitution, we, Rumanians of the Pin-dus, demand to be made part of the new State of Albania. United to Albania, with whom centuries of friendly neighbourhood and peaceful relations have familarized us, we shall be preserved to our national destinies; incorporated into Greece, we shall be inexorably doomed to disappear " (1).

Another mistake of the London Conference was that of having traced the southern borders of Albania in a

(1) As an ethnical curiosity, and by way of showing how persistant Roman traditions are among these descendents of the old legionaries of the Empire,

way that one of her most important roadways lies in a great part in Greek territory. This is the road that crosses the Greek frontier at Caravia to re-enter in Albania at Melisopetra (Table 6th), and the only good one of southern Albania, being practicable to carriages. As it joins to the sea Southern Albania, as well as the important centre of Coritza, the great damage which this mistake would cause to the Albanian State is obvious, as its communications would thus fall under foreign control, unless a new road were built at great expense, linking Delvino, Argirocastro and Liaskovik, overcoming serious natural difficulties. The confine ought then to be modified in such way as to make this road

we transcribe here the *Legend of the Pindus*, that all these mountaineers know by heart:

*Spuneti, munti analti anostri,
Spuneti voi ce stiti di noi?
Spuneti valiuri, spuneti caliuri,
Tine Pinde, plin di oi?
Spuneti popûla anostu di la care n'acâtâm
Cà di la altu na putem noi adivàral s'invitâm!
Si io 'ntreb di limba avoastrà
Puli ce vin di l'Apenini
Çe tu erghile si feriçile na nostri coiburi adarâ
Si tu câuteçeale a lor mic si mare 'si zic:
Voi veniti hiti di la Roma
Timpuri vecli si trecuti
V'am vizut cu cârtea 'n mânâ
V'am vizut ce buñi Latini
V'am vizut cu apala 'n mânâ*

run entirely on Albanian soil, and this would require but a small territorial sacrifice on the part of Greece.

Besides, another small rectification would be necessary South of C. Stilo, not only to ensure a more effective neutrality of the Corfu Canal, with the guarantee that both its shores should not belong to the same Nation, but also because, taking into account the geographical configuration and the existing roadways, the roadstead of Sajada, assigned to Greece by the Conference of London, is the natural and sole supply base of Konispoli and the other villages near the frontier still left to Albania. As the confine, for evident strategical reasons, could not be brought more northwards—which

V'am vizut ca giofii Latini!

Asi (accsi) n'aspune auslâ Pindu

Si nê ziçe, hiti cu minte

Aunziti pâpânilor vostri

Si duceti 'nainte!

Tell us, high mountains; tell us ye vales; tell us ye roads; and ye Pindo, full of sheep; tell ye, what do you know about us? Tell us from which people we descend, as from the others (the Greeks) we cannot possibly learn the truth. « Even I—thus the Pindo speaks—ask of your language to the migratory birds, which come from the Apennine to build their nest on our mountains, and from their melodic accents I have learned that you came from Rome in olden times, carrying in one hand a book, as wise Latins, and in the other a sword, as brave Latins ». So old Pindo answers, adding: « Be wise, be like your fathers, go always on ».

(From *Itinerari Albanesi*, by Antonio Baldacci, Rome 1917).

thing would constitute a new violation of Albanian rights—it ought at least reach Kalamas.

By article 7 of the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) Italy consented "not to oppose the possible wish of France, Great Britain and Russia, to divide the northern and southern districts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece", and further on: "In any case Italy will secure to Albania a sufficiently extended territory to make her frontier reach those of Greece and Serbia East of the lake of Ochrida".

Certainly Italy will stand by her word, but at the Peace Conference many territorial and political questions, left undecided in the Treaty of London, will have to be dealt with. It will then be possible to return to this argument, offering, for instance, some other territorial compensations to Greece and Serbia.

The Conference of London reduced the Albanian State to a population of 800,000 inhabitants. If it must live a healthy life, instead of taking away from it in the North the most important town of Scutari, which has always been called "Scutari of Albania", and in the South all or part of the district of Santi Quaranta (with Butrento, the only port of southern Albania, important for its fishing industry) it would be necessary to grant it at least the few above proposed frontier enlargements.

In the aforesaid article 7, we can easily see, as in the exclusion of Fiume and Spalato from the territory assigned to Italy, the hand of Russia, whose policy always aimed to protect and further the interests of the Slavs in the Balkans. As Russia has not fulfilled her obligations towards the Entente Powers in general, and Italy in particular, it is not unjust that Italy should demand a revision of some of the clauses imposed by her, without sensibly modifying the Treaty of London.

THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF WILSON AND THE GENERAL INTERESTS OF EUROPE.

The great European war that has cost humanity such dire sacrifices, will have been waged at a dead loss to the victorious Nations, unless the future political regulation of Europe and the World be such as to preclude the possibility of a fresh war, at all events for a long time to come.

We do not intend to pass in review here the complex question of the future arrangement of Europe, but shall limit ourselves to the consideration of that part of it concerning the aspirations of Italy in the Adriatic and its hinterland, trusting to be able to prove that their realization offers the only probability of avoiding future conflicts.

Italy demands :


1st. Julian-Venetia and Istria up to their natural confines, (watershed of the Julian Alps), comprising the territory of Fiume as far as the San Marco reef.

2nd. All the islands of Dalmatia, and the Curzolan Group.

3rd. The present province of Dalmatia from the innermost recess of the Morlacca Canal to the Na-



Traù - The *loggia* of the Cippico palace.



Spalato - Palace of Diocletian.

renta, and up to the watershed of the Dinaric Alps.

4th. The possession of Valona, with a background sufficient for the defence of the town.

5th. The protectorate of Albania in some form.

Against these aspiration, —founded as we have seen in the foregoing Chapters upon historical, ethnical, geographical, strategical and economic bases, — clash the new claims raised by the Jugo-Slavs who, pleading the figures of the Austrian statistics, make appeal to the principles of Wilson against the so-called imperialism of Italy.

We say *new claims* advisedly, because it must not be forgotten that up to 1916 Serbia's statesmen in all their public utterances only asked for adequate *commercial acces* to the Adriatic, as is evidenced by the declarations of President Pasic in the Servian Parliament.

We say "new" because Trumbic, too, had adhered in principle to the Treaty of London when he was in want of Italian help to break the might of Austria-Hungary.

We sav "new", finally, because never, until the end of last November, had there been any question of Jugo-Slav aspirations to the ownerships of a fleet in the Adriatic.

"L'appetit vient en mangeant" says an old French adage, and never has it been more strikingly illustrated than in the present attitude of the Jugo-Slavs. From

the unpretending simple commercial outlet, they are now, after so short a time, laying claim to the whole of Dalmatia, all Istria and Gorizia, with surrounding territory. The more moderate of them want their frontier on the Isonzo, the more agitated are satisfied with nothing less than the Tagliamento!

These pretensions are based on the following arguments:

1st. The absolute majority of the population in the contested territories are Slavs, therefore according to the principles laid down by Wilson, these lands by natural right fall to Jugo-Slavia.

2nd. By their rebellion the Slavs and Croatians contributed powerfully to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, consequently to the triumph of the Entente Powers, whose allies they therefore proclaim themselves, and so participant in the fruits of a common victory.

3rd. Slavs and Croatians have declared their union with Serbia, the chief martyr among the Entente Nations, who by her sacrifice, and at last by her valiant action, contributed largely to the victory over the Bulgarians, thereby earning a special claim to the gratitude of the other Allies.

4th. The treaty of London is now valueless because contrary to the principle of Wilson, accepted since by all the signers, because Serbia and the Slav

and Croatian peoples did not adhere to it, and finally because it was drawn up at a time when Russia was a preponderant factor in political Europe, and for the precise purpose of limiting the enormous influence that Power would have obtained in the Balkans after the victory.

5th. The Treaty of London is no longer valid having been annulled by the Treaty of Rome.

6th. Fiume is a necessity for the Jugo-Slav State, being the only important commercial outlet to the sea in the northern tract of the new State, moreover it is not included in the Treaty of London.

7th. The same may be said of Spalato and the intermediate tract.

8th. If the Italian aspirations were to prevail, a perilous Jugo-Slav irredentism would arise in the territories at present in contest, a fact which might lead to another war in the near future.

9th. The historical and strategical motive adduced by Italy for claiming Dalmatia, will be valueless as soon as the future Society of Nation has been formed, and the limitation of armaments becomes effective.

It is an undeniable fact that the pretensions and hopes of the Jugo-Slavs are fomented by the singular attitude of a section of public opinion both in Great Britain and France as also by some military and poli-

tical authorities there, who appear practically to have adopted the views of our competitors, helping on in fact their system of propaganda as well as their reaction against the military measures taken by Italy, and depreciating our share of sacrifice in the common effort that led to victory.

With regard to this latter point, it may be well to note here, first the enormous importance that our declaration of neutrality had in 1914 for the Entente, then our having entered war in 1915, when the fortunes of war were so unpropitious to their arms; and finally the fact that Italy, succeeded in raising a fighting force of five million men equal to about 13.2 per cent of her total population (38,000,000) a percentage that none of the great Powers, allied or associated to her, has ever reached. Her war expenditure up to the 30th of October last, amounted to 50 billions in round figures, which, compared to her total wealth, represents a burden far heavier than that which either France, England or America have had to bear.

Her casualties were: dead 465,908 (army and navy); wounded 953,591; incapacitated by wounds or ailments due to the war 500,000. She lost 57.52 per cent of her merchant tonnage, while England only lost 42.63 per cent, and France only 39.44 per cent. She suffered from devastation in the invaded provinces,

losses valued at several billions, and cheerfully suffered privations in the way of food and combustibles such as no other Nation has known. What the cold winters in Milan and Turin were without heating can be better imagined than described.

Then we have to remember that the Austrian army remained compact and combatively fit till the last moment, so much so that during the first days of the battle of Vittorio, the fate of our arms appeared extremely uncertain because of the desperate resistance opposed by the enemy on the Grappa and the Piave, which was only overcome by the bold and wily manoeuvre of our armies. We must remember, too, that after Caporetto, our troops alone stopped the enemy on the Grappa and the Piave, whereas the French and English deemed that in such a position it would be impossible to arrest the impetuous onslaught of the Austro-Hungarian's army, and so kept the troops sent to our relief on the Mincio and the Po. Again we must remember that in the battle of Vittorio, against the 73 Austrian divisions, there were in line beside our own 53, only three British division, two French, one Czecho-Slovak, and one American regiment.

It would therefore appear as though Italy's contribution ought to be more fully recognized by her Allies, and that her aspirations, which are but the

completion of her unity and her independence, might meet with more benevolent consideration on their part.

But putting aside these considerations, exceedingly bitter to the heart of every Italian, let us examine one by one the arguments set up against us by our Jugo-Slav friends.

As to the first, beside the reasons set forth in the chapter "The ethnical problem", we Italians may oppose the fact that the principle of auto-decision by plebiscite, which our adversaries declare to be the synthesis of the Wilsonian principles, does not exactly apply to territories in which the nationality is uncertain, to the so-called "grey zones". There are cases in which the right of number is only the brute right of might, to overthrow which we have fought so hard.

And this is precisely the case with our Italian Adriatic lands, in the greater part of which the Slav and Croatian element, however preponderant, does not certainly represent the predominant element.

On the other hand it seems curious that this point should be insisted on in Italy's case, while other Nations are preparing to annex territories whose inhabitants belong to various nationalities. And at this point we believe our theory will be best demonstrated by figures (*See page 89*).

No comparative study can however be based on these

A) According to the famous Austrian statistics of 1910, falsified, as everybody knows, to the detriment of the Italians, we should have the following figures:

TERRITORIES	ITALIANS comprising Italian subjects		CROATIANS		SLOVENES		GERMANS		MAGYARS		TOTAL
	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	
EASTERN FRIUL.	90.119	36,3	—	—	154.564	62,3	3.500	1,4	—	—	248.183
TRIESTE	118.959	63,4	—	—	56.916	31,4	11.856	6,3	—	—	187.731
ISTRIA	147.417	39,7	168.184	45,4	55.134	14,1	—	—	—	—	370.735
FIUME	30.000	62,0	12.000	24,8	—	—	—	—	6.400	13,2	48.400
DALMATIA	18.028	2,9	610.699	97,0	—	—	488	0,07	—	—	629.215
TOTAL	404.523	27,2	790.883	53,3	267.614	17,9	15.844	1,0	6.400	0,4	1.484.264

B) Rectified in the most moderate degree, and by the most competent authorities the above figures should be substituted by the following for the year 1915:

TERRITORIES	ITALIANS comprising Italian subjects		CROATIANS		SLOVENES		GERMANS		MAGYARS		TOTAL
	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	
EASTERN FRIUL.	125.000	48,4	—	—	130.000	50,3	3.500	1,3	—	—	258.500
TRIESTE	182.000	78,7	—	—	37.000	16,0	12.000	5,2	—	—	231.000
ISTRIA	182.000	48,9	140.000	37,6	50.000	13,5	—	—	—	—	372.000
FIUME	35.000	63,6	13.000	23,6	—	—	—	—	7.000	12,7	55.000
DALMATIA	80.000	12,4	563.000	86,3	—	—	2.000	0,3	—	—	645.000
TOTAL	604.000	38,7	716.000	45,7	217.000	13,9	17.500	1,1	7.000	0,4	1.561.500

figures, they being the outcome of such oppressive and fraudulent measures as to deprive them of all value.

Anyone wishing to control this statement need only consult the publication "Dalmatia" (La Dalmazia) by Professor Giotto Dainelli, in which at pag. 46 and following, he demonstrates by irrefutable arguments how in 1915, the Italians in Dalmatia cannot have been fewer than 80,000, that is four times the number furnished by the Austrian Census sheet.

And this, without taking into account the 300,000 Morlaks of Dalmatia which, in both enclosed statistical Tables (*See page 89*), are included among the Croatians, and in reality are of Latin race.

Now according to the German Official statistical reports the population of Alsace-Lorraine was thus divided :

	Germans	French	Percentage of Germans
Lower Alsace .	671.425	26.394	95.8 %
Upper " .	481.375	31.771	93 %
Lorraine . . .	481.460	146.097	75.5 %
Total	1.634.260	204.262	87.2 %

In the political Elections, 354.461 persons voted, namely 84.9 of the names on the lists. The German Candidates got 331.702 votes, the Francophiles 22.759 votes, that is 6.42 % of the votes deposited.

In Styria and Carinthia, for the following districts, claimed by the Jugo-Slavs, the Reports show :

	Germans	Slovenes
District of Marburg (Styria)	22.6 %	77.2 %
» » Klagenfurth (Carinthia)	78 %	21 %

In Boemia (Czech-Slovak claims) we have :

District of Bolmisch-Lipa	Germans 98.4 %	Czechs 1.5 %
» » Bruix	» 79.1 %	» 20.8 %
» » Budweis.	» 42 %	» 57.1 %
» » Eger	» 99.5 %	» 0.4 %
» » Leitmeritz	» 79.6 %	» 20.2 %
» » Reichenberg	» 94.6 %	» 5.3 %

In all Boemia :

Inhabitants	6.769.548	Germans 2.467.724	Czechs 4.241.918
Percentage		» 36.7 %	» 63.1 %

In Moravia (Czech-Slovak claims) :

District of Olmutz	Germans 31.2 %	Czechs 68.5 %
» » Znaim	» 53.8 %	» 45.8 %

In all Moravia :

Inhabitants	2.622.271	Germans 719.435	Czechs 1.868.971
Percentage		» 27.6 %	» 71.7 %

In Silesia, claimed by the Czech-Slovaks against

the Germans and Poles, and by these against the Germans and Bohemians :

		Inhabitants	756.949		
Germans	325.532	Czechs	180.348	Poles	235.224
»	43.9 %	»	24.3 %	»	31.7 %

In the regions of Hungary claimed by the Slovaks, these latter only make up 61 % of the population, in some " committees " they are in a decided minority. Thus:

in the district of Presburg	where they do not get to	45.2 %
» » » » Zemplen	» » » » » »	32.6 %
» » » » Zomor	» » » » » »	40.6 %
» » » » Hont	» » » » » »	43.8 %


Throughout all the regions claimed for their State by the Czech-Slovaks there would be :

Czech-Slovaks	7.888.237
Other nationalities :					
Germans	3.732.247
Magyars	661.845
Poles	235.224
Ruthens (approximat.)	80.000
					<hr/>
					4.718.374

For Serbia there are no accurate figures, but two-fifths of the geographical area of Serbia, as it appeared after the Treaty of Bukharest, may be said to have



Spalato - Peristyle of the imperial palace, now Cathedral square.



Lissa - The crowd waits on the pier
the landing of Italian sailors and soldiers.

been inhabited by non-Serbians. Albanians mixed with Serbians, but with a predominance of the former, occupy beside southern Montenegro, a zone limited by the towns of Krusevo-Veles-Uskub (Bulgaro-Albanian) and by a line passing close to Metrovitza and Novi-Bazar.

The Albanian population to-day is about 250,000, and if Serbia were to annex Northern Albania as far as Durazzo, this figure would swell to 500,000.

All eastern Serbia is inhabited by Bulgarians; their zone would be limited by a line drawn from Zaiecar to Kniazevac and from that to Nish (excluded), then along the right-hand of the Morava as far as Uskub, where it reaches the Vardar.

South of the Vardar we have Macedonia in which all inhabitants are Bulgarians mixed with Turks and Armenians. The number of Bulgarians subject to Serbia previous to the present war, certainly came very close to a million.

The Rumanians occupy the valley of The Timor, while in the tract between the Moravia and the Danube their number is, according to the Serbian 150,000, by their own account 300,000.

All this is very eloquent, for it shows the difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of applying rigidly the principle of nationality in solving the territorial problems with which the Peace congress will find itself con-

fronted. It shows too that, among the Entente Nations, Italy is by no means the most imperialistic.

And this brings us to the second Point. We have already pointed out elsewhere that the Austrian army comprised in first line numbers of Slovenian and Croatian troops, which went on fighting implacably against our forces up to the very last moment, when the armistice was signed. Then the Jugo-Slav emissaries who landed at Rodi Garganico shortly before we started our offensive, and which the Jugo-Slav press now represent as having been withheld from action by Italy, while they carried in the fold of their tunic the ruin of Austria's army and the surrender of her fleet to the Entente, have themselves declared that they intended to start a revolt in the rear of the Austrian army *when we attacked*, proving by their words how the nationalities oppressed by the Empire were awaiting our help, and not vice-versa. Nothing whatever did they say about the fleet, in which perfect discipline reigned ⁽¹⁾.

(1) It is interesting to recall here the declaration which were made at the Rome meeting (which gave birth to the so called "Pact of Rome") by Dr. Benes, representing the Czech-Slovakian Nation, to Mr. Malagodi, director of the Italian newspaper *Tribuna*. Signor Malagodi had asked Dr. Benes if it would have been possible that internal revolutionary movements would arise in Austria-Hungary leading to an aid to the action of the Italian army.

"We must not reckon upon that possibility—said Dr. Benes.—If we should try now a revolutionary movement, we would be massacrated in bulk.

It has since come to light that, at the last moment, when the defeat of the Austrians was imminent, the National Council of Zagabria pointed out to the Austrian Supreme Command, the necessity of prolonging the resistance on the Piave front to the uttermost, and this for the purpose of enabling them, (the Jugo-Slavs), to confront our victorious armies with the "fait accompli" of a new State just sprung to life, which would annex to itself the territories claimed by Italy, and proclaim its alliance with the Entente Powers, thus paralysing any form of reactions on Italy's part.

This plan did not succeed, owing to the overwhelming rapidity of the Italian advance, and the auto-decision of Trieste and Fiume.

It would not therefore appear as if the Slovenians and Croatians had rendered any real service to the Entente, especially if compared with what Italy has done ; while real help has been given by the Czech-Slovaks only, through their continual agitation, by their desertion from the Austro-Hungarian army and by the fact of their fighting in the ranks of the Entente armies. The Slovenes and Croatians have ever been steadfast in their allegiance to the Hapsburg Monarchy,

We could have some movements, but not before the Austro-Hungarian army has suffered a defeat really grave and decisive. Only in this case should we witness a revolution, and there would be some hope of a dissolution of the ancient regime ".

which made use of them to combat Italian influence in Dalmatia, Istria, and Julian Venetia: many among them remained to the last trusty functionaries of that powerful burocrocy which held the Danubian Empire together, and only when the Austrian defeat was evident, did they forsake the Hapsburgs, and begin to display the Jugo-Slav cockade with a view to preserving their positions, their emoluments, and perhaps too with the hope of a restoration of the Danubian Monarchy.

As to the alliance with the Entente, proclaimed when victory was on the march, we would observe that, from a legal point of view, there can be no question of an Alliance as long as the Jugo-Slav State has not been recognized by the Powers, and such recognition has up to now not taken place.

Then, from a moral point of view—and this is what counts—this proclaimed alliance with a people who until yesterday fought as a single man against the Entente, and now openly declares hatred against one of its component Nations—Italy—to the extent of exciting the mob by evoking the memory of the Slovenes and Croations that fell at Lissa and on the Carso ⁽¹⁾, this alliance, we say, is something that smacks too strongly of a stratagem, (conceived with a view of avoiding the consequences of defeat) to allow of its being taken seriously.

(1) Proclamation of the Hon. Biankini (Narodni List) Zagabria Assembly.

Let the accounts between the Entente in general, and Italy in particular, be squared with the ex-Hapsburg Empire, and then we may even become the allies of the Jugo-Slavs. For if this principle were admitted for this people that has done nothing positive for us, the same amnesty ought to be granted to Turkey and to Bulgaria that have shaken off their old Germanophile rulers.

Stillmore ought it to apply to Germany who, by a revolution has overthrown the agencies responsible for the war.

Italy, then, should consent to being deprived of the fruit of her victory simply because the Jugo-Slavs elected to proclaim their union with Serbia, the great Martyr. Now, while animated by the sincerest sympathy and admiration for the brave and unfortunate Serbian nation, we cannot afford to be, as the saying is, "more royalist than the King". Up to a short while ago, Serbia by the mouth of her political men asked for no more than a mere commercial outlet on the Adriatic, and this has been granted her with a lavish hand. Moreover Italy is disposed to favour in every way her economic and industrial development, provided Serbia does not alienate the goodwill of Italy by excessive demands, and provided she does not forget her debt of gratitude towards us, not alone for our contribution to the Victory of the Allies, but also for all we did

to save the remains of her army in precipitous retreat immediately after the Austrian invasion.

Regarding this latter point, it is curious to note how, up to quite a short time ago, this debt of gratitude was keenly felt by the Serbian people, and how their sympathies, chiefly after the long contact with our troupes in Macedonia, were expecially directed towards Italy.

How comes it then that only now—when this young Nation eager for greatness, has been dazzled by the prospect of adding to its territory lands to which she had hitherto never dared lift an eye—all feelings of gratitude and sympathy have given place to hatred and even to threats of war?

And besides what sort of confidence can we possibly derive from this union so loudly proclaimed between Serbian, Croatians, Slovenians and Montenegrines? Let us rememeber that its very announcement in Zagabria gave rise to a conflict between Serbians and Croatians. The truth is that this union is something contrary to nature. The catholic Croatians and Slovenes never can run in harness with the orthodox Serbians: in fact the hatred between these two peoples has been unflinching for centuries, and we all know how bitter religious divergencies and strifes are apt to be among the Balkan peoples.

Alike by Serbians and Italians, the Croatians and

Slovenians were, up to quite lately, looked upon as the trustiest agents and followers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose policy has ever aimed at the compression and depression of all development, all initiative in Serbia and in Italy.

Croatians and Slovenians on the one hand, and Serbians on the other, are now held together solely by the bond of a common hatred for Italy, failing which (through somnolence or reconciliation), the old feeling will take the upper hand again, and the union so loudly boasted of, will fall asunder as all unnatural things are bound to. Why should Italy favour the former Hapsburg servants?

Serbia has an undoubted right to be considered in the Peace-conditions, both because of her prolonged torture and the share her troops took in the victory of Franchet d'Esperey's armies. Her contribution is, however, not to be compared with that of Italy; it would therefore not be fair that the greater benefits bestowed on the former, should be granted at the expenses of the latter.

But the crucial point of the controversy is the actual value of the Treaty of London. Setting aside the fact that it would not do for those who signed it in the hour of need, to deny it now, after victory, when these same signatories have loudly proclaimed their horror of

the German Chancellor's "scrap of paper" theory, let us confine ourselves to examining the judicial value of the contestations to which that contract has given rise. It is said to have become null and void through the fact of all the signatories having accepted Wilson's principles, which are opposed to the spirit of that treaty.

Among the 14 Points of the programme of the World Peace announced in President Wilson's Message to Congress on January 9th 1918, the following only can have any bearing on the Treaty of London:

9th. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.

10th. The peoples of Austria-Hungary whose place among the Nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

14th. A general association of Nations must be formed under specific conventions for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

Later, on the 12 February, in another message to Congress, Wilson set fast the following four essential conditions for a righteous peace.

The principles to be applied are the following:

1st. Each element of the final solution shall be founded upon the essential justice and righteousness of

each particular case, and upon such systems as are most likely to bring forth a lasting peace.

2nd. Peoples and provinces shall not be bartered between one ruler and another as though they were mere objects or counters in a game, even if that game were the great one, henceforward and forever discredited, of the "balance of power".

3rd. Whatever territorial solution the war may implicate, shall be effected in the interest and to the advantage of the populations concerned, and not as part of any mere settlement or compromise between the claims of rival States.

4th. All well-defined national aspiration shall be satisfied to the uttermost degree possible without introducing new, or perpetuating old elements of strife, such as would be likely to bring about eventually the end of peace in Europe, and consequently in the world.

We note at once that the formula used in point 9th concerning the Italian aspirations, is worded very differently from that which in the preceding N. 8 was used for France, to whom Alsace-Lorraine was assigned without any discussion whatever, because of the wrong inflicted on that Nation on 1871. This difference may possibly find a justification in the Caporetto disaster, which had appened a short time previous to the publication of the 14 points, though by no means in the

relative excellence of the cause. True, Dalmatia and the other Italian regions have been separated from the mother country for a longer time than the two Rhenish provinces, but solely on account of foreign domination, and because the Italian unity was not complete, due to the insuccess of our arms in 1866. For us Italians Julian-Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia have the same value as Alsace-Lorraine for the French, and be it remembered, the ethnical condition of all these territories is analogous. Indeed in these latter provinces the French form a smaller minority than the Italians in the former.

But apart from this, what does Wilson mean by "clearly distinguishable lines of nationality"? If by nationality he intends to refer only to the ethnico-statistical majority, how is it possible to trace such a line in the contested territory? This would lead to an absurdity in the shape of a frontier-line along the coast, from the Isonzo to Pola with the hinterland in the hands of another Nation. Or should we sacrifice also Trieste, Capodistria, Pirano, Cittanova, Parenzo, Rovigno and Pola, Italian if anything fewer was, to the Slav hinterland in which there are no important centres?

We believe that by *nationality* President Wilson means the aggregate of those phenomena: historical geographical, ethnical, linguistical, cultural, economical, etc., etc., that lend its peculiar physiognomy to a territory,

and that form its true nationality: the phenomena by which Malta, though mainly inhabited by Italians, is now in reality British, Corsica and Nice French, Alsace-Lorraine French, and so on.

If this be so, the Treaty of London is not in discord with Wilson's 9th Point; indeed by effect of it the Treaty ought to be integrated by the assignment to Italy of Fiume and of the Dalmatian coast down to the Narenta.

Neither does Point 1 clash with the Treaty of London, for a sufficient number of sea-outlets would remain to the Jugo-Slavs, and Italy is ready to conclude such commercial treaties to their and her advantage as would ensure the development of the new State.

But if the 14 Points are not in contrast with the Treaty of London, the four standards of February 12th are a direct confirmation of its rectitude and equity.

As a matter of fact we believe that the only solution that can give promise of permanent peace is that which Italy claims: because of the strategical guarantees it offers, which would cure any hankering after conquest on the part of the Jugo-Slavs, because of the certainty it inspires that the Slavs will get fair treatment at our hands, and finally because of the reasons we propose to indicate elsewhere when handling the question of Jugo-Slav irredentism in the lands that Italy will annex.

Point number 2 does not modify what we have said above: what Italy demands is no barter or bargain, and has no bearing on the balance of power, whereas it is the recognition of a territorial and geographical right, of an economic and strategical necessity, essential alike to our future and to our security.

What Italy demands constitutes a positive advantage to the populations of the Adriatic coast-lands, inasmuch as they have ever derived all the elements of their subsistence and their prosperity exclusively from the sea, and from the means of contact it affords with the Orient, the opposite coast and the ports on the Eastern shore.

The union of the provinces we used to call "Irredente" to Jugo-Slavia, a State totally new to maritime questions, and having no technical or cultural preparation whatever in such matters, would mark the commercial decadence of Trieste and Fiume, and deprive Dalmatia of her sole source of prosperity in the future. Whereas Italy promises (and she will keep her word) to those regions the renewal and extension of their old-time commercial dealings in European Orient, with the addition, as we have seen, of all that considerable stream of exchange-traffic between the Peninsula and Balkania which Italy alone can promote, provided, of course, she gets what she asks.

As to the 4th Point we can at once assert that among the aspirations of the various peoples none are more clearly defined than those of Italy, founded as they are upon ages of unbroken Italic traditions, influence and culture in the Irredent lands, which have been kept up at enormous sacrifice, amid bitter strife, against oppression and foul play of all kinds. This well characterized national spirit was officially recognized even by the Austro-Hungarian government up to 1866.

And should anyone object that this would be perpetuating old elements of discord (we shall see later the value of this objection), we can answer that by satisfying the Jugo-Slavs new and stronger ones would be created, for, as the Italian Irredent inhabitants never desisted from the struggle during the period of the Triple Alliance when our government disinterested itself completely from the Adriatic question, so they would not fail to revive it afresh with unflagging zeal and enthusiasm, should they be unjustly sacrificed after having had a momentary illusion that their ideals had been realized.

There is nothing in the Wilsonian ideas, interpreted practically and in consistency with real and local exigencies that can be said to run counter to what was stipulated in London. Neither can the right to auto-decision be registered against us after the imposing

manifestations of Trieste, the Istrian towns, Fiume, various centres in the Quarnero Isles, Zara, etc., etc., unless we arrive to the absurd point of assigning these centres to Italy, giving the surrounding country to the Jugo-Slave State.

Concerning the non-adhesion of Serbia and the Jugo-Slavs to the Treaty of London we shall limit ourselves to one objection: when that Treaty was signed, Serbia's political men were totally disinterested in the land now under contest: they dreamt of nothing beyond *the commercial outlet on the Adriatic*, and they had not yet become the defenders of the Croats and Slovens, these last being at the time our enemies.

As a matter of fact the interests of the Balkans peoples were at that time presided over by Russia; it was even by her express wish that Fiume and Spalato were excluded from the territories recognized as Italy's lawful claim.

Neither can its non recognition by America constitute a depreciation of the Treaty of London, that Nation having elected to go to war without binding herself to any pre-existing treaties or agreements among the Allies, and without stipulating any on her own account.

A pueril assertion is that made by the Jugo-Slav and Jugo-Slavophile Press according to which the Treaty of London was concluded out of hatred to Russia and

with a view to limite her ascendancy in the Balkans and preventing her from reaching the Adriatic seaboard across New-Serbia ; and that after the fall of Russia, the "prima causa" for such preoccupation having disappeared, no arrangement contemplated in that treaty has any further need to exist. Now as a matter of fact, the treaty was not concluded out of hatred to Russia, but for the precise purpose of recognizing the aspirations of Italy, which were diminished instead by the will of Russia.

The Treaty of London has therefore by no means lapsed in consequence of the recognition of the Wilsonian principles and of the new situation arisen through the fall of Austria. On the contrary we mantain that it represents a minimum of what Italy is entitled to, which minimum ought now to be surpassed:—

because Russia not having fulfilled her engagements, the effort that Italy had to sustain has been far beyond her previsions ;

because the war lasted far longer than it would have, if Russia had remained as she was ;

because Italy succeeded in obtaining a victory so complete as to determine the cessation of the enemy resistance ;

because the defection of Russia has been the cause for Italy of incalculable moral and material injury due


to the invasion, a fact which could not be foreseen when the Treaty was concluded on account of the strategical situation at the moment.

Then the Jugo-Slavs maintain that the Treaty of London was annulled by the so-called Treaty of Rome, a thing with which we really cannot agree. The Treaty of Rome was nothing more than recognition of the nationalities oppressed by Austria; and all territorial questions were explicitly excluded from it, for the precise purpose of safeguarding our acquired rights. Thus Italy, too, recognized the right of the Slovenian and Croatian nationalities to an independent existence and to the help of the Entente in conquering it: but this does not implicate the recognition of every mad pretention on the part of the neo-candidate for liberty, nor the recognition of their quality as allies: the Treaty of London was able to pass through even this ordeal!

The assertion that Fiume is necessary to the Jugo-Slav State is easily disposed of. Fiume is not the natural sea-outlet of that State, with regard to which it lies too far North. We have already seen how small a share Slavonia and Croatia take in the commercial dealings of Fiume, and how the remaining Jugo-Slav countries converge their traffic towards other ports: Slovenia (Laibach) to Trieste, Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Danube or the central and southern Dalmatian ports.



Ragusa - Panorama.



Clissa - The aquile rock of the Venetians.

For that matter the most convenient road to the sea for Northern Jugo-Slavia is that over the Vratnik Pass, corresponding to the port of Segna, a good natural harbour which might be easily improved and connected with the railway junction of Ogulin by a short branch-line of about 50 Kilometers, thus reducing the distance between Agran (Zagabria) and the sea to about 150 Kilometers, instead of 200 that now separate that town from Fiume.

Fiume is on the contrary the natural port for Hungary and part of Czeco-Slovakia, for which Nations it would certainly be preferable that it was Italian rather than Jugo-Slav.

As to Spalato, it is in reality the natural outlet for Bosnia Herzegovina to which regions it is united by a still unfinished railway-line, but it cannot be separated from the rest of Dalmatia, and on the other hand we have seen in our study on the economic problem that the function of this port in the above capacity can continue even under Italian rule.

This brings us to the main argument: the peril of a future Jugo-Slav irredentism in the lands annexed to Italy.

The great bulk of the Croatian and Slav population in Venezia Giulia, Istria and Dalmatia, is composed of peasants averse to political agitation, little, if at all

swayed by any sense of nationality, and accustomed for centuries to the predominance of the Italians, whose lands many of them cultivate.

These people need the Italians to help them to develop their business and in all their concerns. They are accustomed to Italian pre-eminence in number in the Coast-Centres, and everywhere to their superior social, moral and intellectual culture. Catholic by religion they have the deepest aversion for the Serbians, and would in a large majority far prefer Italian to Serbian rule.

Along-side with these indifferent peasants there has formed in latter years a group of new men who, having acquired a university education and egged on by the Austrian Government, have set on foot a system of propaganda against the Italians, forming a regular anti-italian party, which under Austria had no other purpose than supplanting their adversaries in the municipal and provincial administrations ; now that Austria has fallen it is they that are carrying on the agitation for a union with Serbia.

These people have been powerfully aided in their work of denationalization by the illegal opening of a number of Croatian and Slovenian schools directed by fanatical teachers and by priests, always ready to cringe to the Hapsburg Government.

Just now this party, not in itself a very numerous, has succeeded in taking in tow a pretty large following from among the aforesaid peasants, partly by persuasion, partly through dread of reprisals, making them believe that by the decisions of the Peace Conference, Italy will have to give up the lands she now occupies, in which belief they are, we regret to say is conformed by the unconscious attitude of some of our Allies.

However in the territories occupied by us we can already perceive that wherever these mischief-making instigators have not been able to keep up their hate-propaganda, that is, we may safely say, in the greater part of these territories, the Slav and Croatian populations have not only fallen in with the new order of things, but even show gratitude for the benefits and the security conferred on them by our troops, desisting from all opposition.

Things being so, it becomes evident that once our rule has been established over those regions, and the populations become reassured as to their fate, when the few perturbing elements have been removed and the Schools and clergy reformed, our ultra-liberal systems of government doing the rest, the bulk of the people will at the least resign themselves to their fate and abandon all agitation against us.

For the matter of that, twenty centuries of Latin

traditions in Dalmatia go to prove, that the Italian civilization has had the power to assimilate the inferior forms with which it was brought in contact in those lands, so much so that many of the Dalmatians and Istrians now openly agitating on behalf of Italian predominance in their countries, are of Slav or Croatian origin.

No danger of Irredentism, all the more so as the economic benefits redounding to those lands from their union with Italy will soon become clearly evident.

Besides Italy has no imperialistic views and when her present aspirations have been realized, she would not have any other territorial aims in the Balkans, and it would be to her interest, and in harmony with her instincts, to co-operate in the economic revival of old and new States in that region.

If, on the contrary, the contested provinces were to fall partly or entirely under Jugo-Slav dominion, the consequences with regard to European peace would be far different.

The methods of de-nationalization put into practice by the Serbians are well-known; yet anyone desirous of a closer acquaintance with the same, need only consult "*L'Enquête dans les Balkans*": *Rapport présenté aux Directeurs de la dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale par les membres de la Commission d'en-*

quête, Paris, Edition Cris & C.ie, 1914. From this report, drawn up by Americans whose Spirit of fair play is above all suspicion, we learn how the Serbians after the Balkan Wars perpetrated all kinds of atrocity, every hateful imposition, every artifice to de-nationalize the conquered lands whose inhabitants were for the most part Bulgarians and Albanians.

Massacres, pillage, exile, arrests, impositions of all kinds were the order of the day; the report quotes textually "no form of cruelty, no brutality, no violence was spared" (pag. 134 and following).

Nor were these methods resorted to just in a moment of aberration: they are the offspring of a mental attitude common to Serbians and Croats alike, and we see them revived now in Montenegro, where every manifestation of that helpless people contrary to the projected union with Serbia is being systematically stamped out; even at Zagabria where a portion of the inhabitants rebelled against the annexation of Croatia by the Kingdom of Serbia, in a word wherever a voice arises in protest against the boundless ambition of the Serbians.

They would not fail to apply the system to Dalmatia, Istria and Julian-Venetia, should these regions be so luckless as to fall into their hands. Then, indeed, the irredentism of the Italian minority would rise up in fierce and threatening attitude, ready to continue the

fight for that nationality which they have been striving for centuries to preserve. The struggle would be a desperate and bloody one, and how could a great Nation like Italy fail to be interested in it, or allow her sons on the opposite shore to be persecuted and dispersed?

In this lies the danger of a future war, however averse the Italian people may be to it on the whole. For if Jugo-Slav aspirations were to be only partially satisfied, the Serbians in their incurable imperialism would keep on agitating by every means for the fulfilment of their wishes, emboldened by the strategical inferiority in which Italy would find herself, owing to the want of her natural frontiers.

Then they say that the League of Nations will completely do away with the historical and strategical reasons for which Italy demands Istria and Dalmatia, but on this point too we cannot agree with our adversaries.

First of all, this League has not yet come into being, but even if it had, like all human things it cannot last for ever, nor can it be perfection.

It will not last for ever : therefore if some day it dies out, the pre-war situation will repeat itself for us in a crushing strategical inferiority aggravated by the fact of no longer having the moral support with which the Irredent Italians have hitherto provided us, they having meanwhile disappeared altogether, swamped by

the Jugo-Slav flood. And when that fresh war would have come to its close with a new victory for us, we should find ourselves confronted by territories really denationalized this time, the occupation of which would be much more difficult and dangerous.

It will not be perfection, for there is no blinking the fact that it cannot all of sudden annihilate the territorial ambitions of a young people not easily satisfied. Still less can it lull to inaction so powerful a sentiment as that which has sustained the Irredent Italians in their secular struggle for nationality.

There would therefore be a continual element not only of discord but of real danger for the League itself, which, called to sit in judgement on so delicate a matter, would find itself obliged to undo what had already been concluded by the Peace Conference, or else insist on the injustice done to Italy, a thing which she could probably not tolerate.

Nor cannot it be said that the internationalizing or neutralizing of those tracts of Adriatic coast assigned to Jugo-Slavia, and the prohibition for her to maintain a war-fleet, would be sufficient strategical guarantees for Italy, as the Jugo-Slavs would be sure to leave nothing undone to free themselves from so great a diminution of their sovereign rights, while on the other hand if another European war were to break out, treaties would

be of no avail, so that even if our competitors on the opposite shore had no navy, the coast might be used as a base for other navies allied to them.

With regard to this latter point, we shall do well to note that the progress realized in military technique is such as to permit the creation of a practically effective naval base, in an extremely short time, indeed we may say that such a defence may be actually improvised.

Corfu, for instance, Sebenico and Spalato, can be defended by merely installing a system of anti-aircraft batteries, obstructions and minefields, a matter of a few days work. Besides, the placing of big guns can be effected to-day in very brief space of time.

Then for an air raid no defensively prepared naval base is required, and the neutralization of the coast would give us no advantage or security in this respect.

We believe we have thus demonstrated the inanity of the Jugo-Slavs pretensions, and we now wish to point out how the very interests of Liberal European Nations would impose the complete satisfaction of Italy's aspirations.

In our study on the economic aspect of the Adriatic question we have seen how the office of closing the approaches of the Adriatic and Mediterranean to German commerce devolved upon Italy, and how to fulfil

this mandate she must have complete possession of Julian-Venetia, Istria with Fiume and Dalmatia as far as the Narenta.

But besides the merely economic danger, a possibility has lately arisen of a customs and political union between the new Danubian States, in some of which a certain portion of public opinion has already begun to agitate in favour of the scheme backed up evidently by the underhand agency of former office-holders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, who cannot resign themselves to the ruin of the Monarchy and accept the new "regime" in which, up to this, there would seem to be no room for them.

On the other hand the motto of the Hapsburg *Viribus Unitis* seems more "à propos" than ever and the smaller States will experience an increasing need for unity in order to face the exigencies of modern life and the better safeguarding of their interests.

This is the reason for which while Jugo-Slav and German pursue their deadly feud against Italy, they are giving proof of being able and willing to come to terms about their territorial divergencies, a matter of no less importance for them than the controversy with us. Thus we see the Czech-Slovaks, hitherto so friendly with Italy, taking sides with the Jugo-Slavs and the Austrians and voicing the claims of the former against us.

It is strange to see how, in Austria proper the idea of a Confederation seems to be gaining ground in preference to the other which would seem the more natural, of a union with Germany (See Note of the Editor, page 121).

This probability of an Austrian Confederation is therefore a contingency to be kept in view since it responds to the real interest of its future components; so with regard to the defence against bolshevism, which from Russia has already spread to Germany.

Such a Confederation would be nothing less than a resurrection of Austria-Hungary in a new form and with a vaster territory comprising Old and New Serbia; indeed we may say it would be just accomplishing the dream of the Austrian bureaucracy, which, having lost the game on the battle-fields, would thus have obtained by its very defeat all it hoped to gain by the declaration of war to Serbia. And we may be certain that in a more or less distant future, the circumstances that threw Austria into the arms of Germany will repeat themselves, and most certainly the new federal State would resume the hereditary Austrian policy also in its dreams of power, or, at least, of influence in the East and in Turkey. Liberal Europe, therefore, runs the risk of having had all this blood shed in vain, for we are not to imagine that Germany's power is

broken for ever: a Nation of over 70 millions, accustomed to excel in every sphere of activity, and used to order and discipline will certainly find the energy to heal her wounds, and arise to new life. During this process she will of necessity have to base her policy on the Danubian Confederation. If this latter obtains from the Peace Conference the possession of the Eastern Adriatic shore, together with part of Istria and of Julian-Venetia, as the Jugo-Slavophiles would have it, anyone can see by how much the might of resuscitated Middle Europe would be increased, and in what danger not only Italy, but all the other European Nations, would be. Italy indeed, as she was once compeller to do, might selfishly find her safety in renewing the Alliance with the Central Powers Coalition, of which France and Great Britain would be alone to bear the brunt, since for a long time to come, they will not be able to count on Russia to withstand a resuscitated Teuton might.

Such an alliance would certainly be looked upon as the greatest misfortune here in Italy, but she might nevertheless be obliged to make a virtue of necessity, if her strategical position should again be such as to imperil her very existence.

The consequences of such a contingency would beyond all doubt be considerably attenuated if Italian

aspirations were satisfied, for Italy would then have a secure frontier and the complete control of the Adriatic. She would also be in a position to hold her own against the economic and military pressure of the Teuto-Danubian coalition, and might, with help of the other European nations, check its expansion. This New Italy, powerful from a military point of view and prosperous from an economic one, would be a formidable bulwark against New Germanism. But to carry out this mission, she must have the complete military and economic control of the Adriatic: military for her safety, economic for the development of her wealth; without which her excellent strategical situation would be of no avail, as she would lack the means to take advantage of it.

We can therefore confidently assert that it is in the general interest of Europe that Italy be put in possession not only of Julian-Venetia with Trieste, Istria with Pola, and Dalmatia, (as by the Treaty of London), but of Fiume and Spalato as well, not only to complete her security, but, what is vastly more important, to prevent the lessening of those sources of riches necessary to retrieve the financial situation in which she has been placed by the enormous sacrifices laid upon her by the war.

CAVEANT CONSULES.

NOTE OF THE EDITOR.

These notes on the future Danubian Confederation have been written in the last days of last year, when it seemed very probable that German Austria aimed to rally to the Danubian States. Now things are somewhat changed, and it looks as German Austria intended to join Germany: the tendency to a participation of German Austria to the Danubian Confederation seems cultivated only by the industrial circles and by the clergy.

In Hungary, on the contrary, the movement for a new Danubian Confederation is gaining daily ground in the public opinion, and it seems that the same idea is looked at rather favourably by Czech-slovaks, Serbians, Croatians and Bulgarians, too.

Whatever may be the outlining of the future adjustment of late Mittel-Europa, the danger would remain the same, namely that Germany, compensated at least partially of her losses through the annexation of German Austria, may attract to her commercial and political sphere the new Danubian Federal State.

Germany will be obliged to aim to this end, because she will be surrounded by hostile and strong States, and separated from Russia by Poland. Thus the only possible field of penetration to her will be this agglomeration of Nations—all inferior to her as to strength and progress—which will form the Danubian Confederation.

From what precedes, it derives that nothing must be changed to the conclusions we have arrived at, as to the interest of the whole democratic Europe in fulfilling the Italian aspirations.

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
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